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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146615
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT,
Charging Party,

*

vs.

*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

KENNECOTT CORPORATION

*

UADD No. 92-0393
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418

Respondent.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews this
Motion for Review pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-16. The Respondent
has requested review of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ")
Order of April 26, 1993 granting the Charging Party's request for
a formal hearing to review de novo the Determination and Order of
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD").
The Respondent asserts that the Charging Party's request for
a hearing does not comply with the requirements of Utah law for
granting a formal bearing from a determination and order entered by
the UADD. Respondent asserts that the ALJ's order fails to specify
the basis upon which it is granted and that the record does not
support the grant of a formal hearing.
U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c) provides that "[a] party may file a
written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the director's determination and order within 30
days of the date of the determination and order." The UADD rules
provide that "[a] request for an evidentiary hearing must state a
reason why the hearing is necessary.
A hearing will not be
considered necessary if the hearing will not add to the evidence in
the investigatory file or cause the evidence in the investigatory
file to be viewed differently.1" The rule notes that "[i]n most
cases, the need to cross examine the individuals who have submitted
affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of
the Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a
request for a hearing by the Commission.2"
The Charging Party's request for a hearing asserts that a
hearing is necessary so that a complete investigation can be done.
The Charging Party asserts that evidence reasonably available to
the investigator would show that the Charging Party did establish
a prima facie case of age discrimination, that there is a need to
take testimony from witnesses such as the Charging Party and the
1

U.A.C. R560-l-4(4) (1993).

2

Id.
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people involved in the decision to terminate him and notes that the
investigator failed to interview witnesses or take affidavits. The
Charging Party further claims that there was "evidence" presented
in the charge that the Charging Party was terminated because his
employer wanted to reduce staff in the facility where the Charging
Party worked without having to pay severance benefits, an issue
which was not addressed by the investigator. The Charging Party
asserts that the Commission needs to take evidence regarding the
Respondent's sexual harassment training policy and to investigate
the allegations that the Charging Party sexually harassed his
female co-workers.
The Respondent asserts that the reasons proffered by the
Charging Party are insufficient to warrant a grant of a formal
hearing because the purpose of a formal hearing is not to conduct
an investigation or collect evidence.
In our review of the file, we find that the Charging Party
failed to submit any evidence in support of his claim during the
UADD's informal investigation. He did not complete and sign an
affidavit upon filing his charge and submitted no documentation or
evidence in support of his claim. Every document submitted by the
Charging Party was argument not evidence. We believe that R560-1-4
contemplates that the party seeking review has fully participated
in the proceedings below. The evidence offered by the Charging
Party appears to have been available during the UADD's investigation, but was not supplied at that time. Therefore, the Charging
Party cannot assert that there is evidence which will support his
claim which was not submitted during the investigation, although it
was available at that time.
It is an elementary concept in employment discrimination law
that the burden of proof rests with the Charging Party.3
The

3

See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine. 67 L.Ed, ed 207
(1981). Under Burdine, it is the plaintiff's burden to show that
similarly situated employees were not treated equally and,
ultimately, to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.
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Charging Party did not submit the names of witnesses that he wanted
the investigator to interview and, apparently, made no effort to
submit affidavits or other evidence in support of his charge.
We do not think that a party should be allowed to obtain an
evidentiary hearing by claiming that the UADD has failed to
properly investigate the subject charge when the party requesting
the hearing has failed to participate fully in the proceedings
below.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The Charging Party failed to submit evidence in support of
his charge of discrimination during the investigative proceeding.
2. The evidence the Charging Party seeks to submit at this
time was available at the time of the UADD investigation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Therefore, for the above
Party has failed to show that
pursuant to the requirements
deny his request for a formal

reasons, we find that the Charging
an evidentiary hearing is necessary
of R560-1-4. Therefore, we hereby
evidentiary hearing.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Review of the
Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is
hereby denied.
If you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals you must
do so within 30 days of the date of this Order.
If you want a
transcript of the hearing for your appeal you must bear all the
cost of preparing it.
You also have the right to ask the Industrial Commission to
reconsider this Order, under U.C.A. § 63-46b-13, but you must
request reconsideration within 20 days of the date of this Order.
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You do not have to request reconsideration before you file an
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

DATED this ^ZfJ^

day of

(Q^tiX^^J

1993.

Stephen M. Hadley ^Cftaiirman

•ZO£r\,

Colleen S. Colton, Commissioner
I abstain due to my prior association with one of^tehe parties.

Thomas R. Carlson, Commissioner
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*********************************

On October 26, 1993 the Industrial Commission of Utah
("Commission") issued an "Order Granting Motion for Review"
("Order") in the above entitled case. It would appear that the
Order is internally inconsistent in stating that the Motion for
Review of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge is hereby
denied.
The Administrative Law Judge allowed a request for evidentiary
hearing. Upon review of the file, the Commission concluded that an
evidentiary hearing was not necessary under the circumstances of
this case.
We therefore issue this Order of Clarification sua

sponte.

The Order of the Commission dated October 26, 1993 should be
amended to read as follows:
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Respondent's Motion for
Review requesting that the evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby
granted and the decision of the administrative law judge to grant
the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed.
If you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals you must
do so within 3 0 days of the date of this Order. If you want a
transcript of the hearing for your appeal you must bear all the
cost of preparing it.
You also have the right to ask the Industrial Commission to
reconsider this Order, under U.C.A. § 63-46b-13, but you must
request reconsideration within 20 days of the date of this Order.
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You do not have to request reconsideration before you file an
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this _4£ cL

day of

r 7 o-tr^v^^ L - ,
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34-35-7,1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim —
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings —
Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination,
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent,
make, sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under oath or
affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall be filed
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a
settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt
impartial investigation of all allegations made in the request for agency
action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduct
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred.
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for agency
action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final order.
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to support
the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set
out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall formally report
these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director may issue a
determination and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order
within 30 days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determination and order issued by the director becomes the final order of the
commission.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support
the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set
out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall formally report
these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may issue a
determination and order based on the investigator's report.
28
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(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an evidentiary
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order within
30 days of the date of the determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determination and order issued by the director requiring the respondent to cease
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final order of the commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the
matter may not participate in a hearing except as a witness, nor may he
participate in the deliberations of the presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the
request for agency action may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation,
and the respondent may amend its answer. Those amendments may be made
during or after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding officer finds that
a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the
request for agency action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice.
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed
by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and costs.
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to
cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide
relief to the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all
stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of the order
issued by the presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued by the
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission.
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (ll)(a) is subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16.
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not divulge or make
public any information gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation,
or proceeding before the commission except in the following:
(a) Information used by the director in making any determination may
be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for and
participation in proceedings before the commission.
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the identities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed.
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the attorney general
or other legal representatives of the state or commission.
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting requirements of the federal government.
29
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(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion,
national origin, or handicap.
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based
upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continuation of any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in connection with the same claims under this chapter. Nothing in this
subsection is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy
provision set forth in Subsection (15).
History: C. 1953, 34-35-7.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 189, § 4; 1987, ch. 161, § 105; 1990,
ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 188, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "for
agency action" in Subsection (1Kb) and "for
agency action made under this section" in Subsection (l)(c); substituted "request for agency
action" for "written charge" in Subsection (2),
"a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall
promptly assign an investigator" for "an adjudicative proceeding is set or held, the commission shall assign an investigator to the charge"
in Subsection (3)(a), and "all allegations made
in the request for agency action" for "the allegations made in the charge" in Subsection
(3Kb); deleted former Subsection (3)(c), relating
to the disclosure of information or settlement

efforts; redesignated former Subsection (3)(d)
as Subsection (3)(c); inserted Subsection (3)(d);
and rewrote the remainder of the section to the
extent that a detailed comparison would be impracticable.
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, inserted "discriminatory or" near the end
of Subsection (3)(c); added Subsection (4)(d);
substituted all of the present language of Subsection (8)(a) beginning with "request" for "director's determination and ending the adjudicative proceeding"; deleted "If a director's determination is dismissed" at the beginning of
Subsection (8Kb); added "and costs" at the end
of Subsection (9); substituted "issued by the
presiding officer" for "by the commission" in
Subsection (HXa); rewrote Subsections (12)
and (13); and made minor changes in punctuation and style throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Exclusive remedy.
No independent cause of action found.
Exclusive remedy.
Claims that assert a different injury than
this statute covers, such as intentional tort
claims, and perhaps certain state constitutional claims, are not necessarily foreclosed by
the exclusive remedy provision of Subsection
(11) if an independent cause of action exists
outside this chapter for such claims. Sauers v.
Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah
1990).
This chapter preempts common law causes of
action for discharge in retaliation for complaints
of
employment
discrimination.
Retherford v. AT & T Communications of the
Mt. States, Inc., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1992).
This chapter does not preempt common law
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claims for breach of implied contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious
interference with contract, and negligent employment. Under the "indispensable element"
test adopted for determining whether an exclusive statutory cause of action preempts a common law claim, only those claims for which the
statutory scheme supplies an indispensable
element are barred, and discrimination is not
an indispensable element of these claims.
Retherford v. AT & T Communications of the
Mt. States, Inc., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1992).
No independent cause of action found.
Former county employee's claims of sexual
harassment and discrimination were preempted by this chapter, even though they were
cast as violations of other statutes or the Utah
Constitution. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735
F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R* — Award of front pay under state job
discrimination statutes, 74 A.L.R.4th 746.
Damages and other relief under state legis-

lation forbidding job discrimination on account
of handicap, 78 A.L.R.4th 435.

34-35-8. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3 repeals
§ 34-35-8, as last amended by Laws 1986, ch.
47, § 15, relating to judicial review, effective

April 23, 1990. For present comparable provi
sions, see § 34-35-7.1.

CHAPTER 37
DECEPTION DETECTION EXAMINERS
34-37-1 to 34-37-16. Renumbered.
Renumbered. — Laws 1993, ch. 234,
§§ 201 to 214 renumbered former §§ 34-37-1
to 34-37-3, 34-37-5 to 34-37-13, 34-37-15, and
34-37-16, regulating polygraph operators, as
§§ 53-5-301 to 53-5-314, and § 394 of the act
repealed former § 34-37-14, as last amended

by L. 1981, ch. 98. § 5, a licensure grandfather
clause, effective July 1, 1993.
Section 34-37-4 (L. 1973, ch. 94, § 4), relating to qualification for a license to administer
examinations, was repealed by Laws 1977, ch.
153, § 9.

CHAPTER 38
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING
34-38-1. Legislative findings — Purpose and intent of
chapter.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Labor Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 284.
A.L.R. — Private employee's loss of employ-

ment because of refusal to submit to drug test
as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 86 A.L.R.4th 309.

34-38-6. Requirements for collection and testing.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

31

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

63-46b-8

(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or
power given to an agency by another statute.
History: C, 1953, 63-46b-7, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 263.

Cross-References. — Discovery, U.R.C.P.
26 et seq.

63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts
within the agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is
hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-8, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, S 264; 1988, ch. 72, § 19.

Cross-References. — Judicial notice, Utah
R. Evid. 201.
Privileges, Utah R. Evid. 501 et seq.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cross-examination.
Agency decision revoking social worker's license was reversed and his case was remanded
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-

nesses against him resulted in "substantial
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Intervention.
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene
in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes
to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each party. The petition shall
include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(b) the name of the proceeding;
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights
or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision
of law; and
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency.
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if he determines that:
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the
formal adjudicative proceeding; and
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention.
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in
writing and sent by mail to the petitioner and each party.
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the
intervener's participation in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after
the intervention.
History: C 1953, 63-46b-9, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 265.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Requisites for intervention.
Standing.
Requisites for intervention.
Although Subsection (2) does not grant an
absolute right to intervene, it does establish a
conditional right to intervene if the requisite
legal interest is present. That right is subject
only to the condition that the interests of justice and orderly conduct of the administrative

proceedings will not be impaired. Millard
County v. State Tax Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459
(Utah 1991).
Tax commission's denial of a county's motion
to intervene in a proceeding to redetermine a
taxpayer's sales tax liability was reversed, because the county met the requirements for intervention and the commission's contention
that allowing intervention would clog the entire administrative system was highly exaggerated. Millard County v. State Tax Comm'n,
823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1991).
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-14, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Department of Emp. Sec., 786 P.2d 246 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

ANALYSIS

Administrative review or rehearing.
Commencement of filing period.
— Issuance of order.
Date order issued.
Exhaustion of remedies.
"Filing of petition" construed.
Final appealable order.
Review of tax commission order.
Cited.
Administrative review or rehearing.
Homeowners association was statutorily required to first seek review or rehearing by the
public service commission of its ruling in order
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to review the issue of standby water fees, because the'commission had not been properly
afforded the opportunity to address the issue
on the merits. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah
1989).
Commencement of filing period.
The 30-day time period to file an appeal commences when the final agency order issues and
not when received by a party. The period is not
extended to allow for mailing time. Silva v.

—Issuance of order.
"Issue," as used in this section, means the
date the agency action is properly mailed, as
accurately evidenced by the certificate of mailing, or personally served. This contrasts with
the rule governing appeals from judicial action, the timeliness of which is calculated with
reference to the date of entry. Wiggins v. Board
of Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Date order issued.
For purposes of determining the time limit
for filing for judicial review, the date the order
constituting the final agency action "issues" is
the date the order bears on its face and not the
date it is mailed. Dusty's, Inc. v. Auditing Div.,
842 P.2d 868 (Utah 1992).
Exhaustion of remedies.
It was appropriate for plaintiffs to file their
action for a declaratory judgment in the district court to obtain rulings on legal questions
arising out of administrative proceedings since
the legal questions could not have been finally
determined by the commission in an adminis-
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trative proceeding. Brumley v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah 1993).
"Filing of petition" construed.
The operative act to commence petitioner's
appeal is the filing of the petition with the
clerk. Deposit in the mail does not accomplish
the act of filing. The act of filing a document
requires that the document be deposited with
the court clerk, and not with the post office or
some other mechanism for delivery. Silva v.
Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Service of a petition for review or notice of
appeal on an opposing party does not substitute for nor accomplish the act of filing that
appeal with the clerk. Silva v. Department of
Emp. Sec., 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Final appealable order.
Industrial commission's order adopting an
administrative law judge's findings of fact, but

remanding for a determination of whether the
petitioner should receive medical expenses,
was not a final appealable order. Sloan v.
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
An order of the agency is not final so long as
it reserves something to the agency for further
decision. Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d
463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Review of tax commission order.
A petitioner's time limit for filing for judicial
review of a final tax commission order is prescribed by Subsection (3) of this section and not
§ 59-1-504, which governs petitions for redetermination of deficiencies before the commission and not petitions for judicial review.
Dusty's, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 868
(UUh 1992).
Cited in Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd.,
834 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

63-46b-15. Judicial review —• Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings,
except that the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction over all state agency
actions relating to removal or placement decisions regarding children in
state custody.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or
maintains his principal place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed,
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the
agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is
entitled to obtain judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief
requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to
relief,
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings,
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990,
ch. 132, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the exception at the end of Subsection (l)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Final agency action.
Function of district court.
Right to judicial proceeding.
Cited,
_,. ,
..
Final agency action.
Industrial Commission's determination of
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not
reviewable under this section, because the
commission and the parties had not resolved
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
_
..
#..*•*
_*
Function of district c o u r t
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,
the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-

ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert.
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily
delegated to the district court is to review informal agency adjudicative proceedings. State
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App.
r

rr

199Q)

Right to judicial proceeding.
District court erred in declining a de novo
review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reciprocity, where there had been no proceeding on
his application that was sufficiently judicial in
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing
agency's action reviewed in a Mtrial-type hear*ng-" Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct.
*
1991)
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d
233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct.
App. 1993).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
trial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

ANALYSIS

Agency action.
Applicability of section.
Arbitrary action.
Conflicting evidence.
Factual findings.
Final order.
Function of district court.
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
Prior practice.
Review.
Standard of review.
—Interpretation of statutory term.
—Questions of law.
Substantial evidence test.
Substantial prejudice.
Whole record test.
Cited.

Applicability of section.
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of
deference an appellate court grants to an
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief
should not be granted when, although the
agency committed error, the error was harmless. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

Agency action.
Whether the Industrial Commission acted
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsection (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcrofl v. Indus-

Arbitrary action.
Industrial commission's denial of occupational disease disability benefits based upon a
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of
causation failed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and therefore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v.
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
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Conflicting evidence.
In undertaking a review, the appellate court
will not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though the
court might have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before it for de novo review.
It is the province of the board, not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn
from the same evidence, it is for the board to
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Appellate court refers to the assessment by
the Board of Review of the Utah Industrial
Commission on conflicting evidence. Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp. Sec, 854 P.2d
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Factual findings.
Under Subsection (4)(d), the appellate court
will not disturb the board's application of its
factual findings to the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v.
Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Nelson v. Dep't of Emp. Sec., 801 P.2d
158 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Final order.
Administrative law judge's denial of motions
to dismiss petitions of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing allowed the
proceeding to continue in the agency and was
not a final order for purposes of judicial review.
Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
Nonfinal agency orders do not divest the
agency of jurisdiction. Maverik Country
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 221 Utah
Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1993).
Function of district court.
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45
(Utah 1989).
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over
appeal from jurisdictional hearing conducted
by a hearing officer appointed by the Career
Service Review Board since the hearing was a
formal adjudicative proceeding. Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah C t
App. 1992).

63-46b-16

Prior practice.
Ten agency decisions in which pharmacists
committed equal or allegedly more significant
violations of the law, but received substantially lighter penalties than petitioner received, raised a question about the consistency
of his penalty with prior agency practice.
Pickett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 218 Utah
Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. App. 1993).
Review.
Because POST (Division of Peace Officer
Standards and Training) did not conduct any
formal proceedings, and petitioner's filing of a
"complaint" with POST about an officer did not
require it to do so, the appellate court did not
have jurisdiction to review POSTs decision not
to pursue decertification of POST officer. Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. & Training, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Standard of review.
Under Subsection (4)(d), it is appropriate for
a court to review an agency's interpretation of
its statutorily granted powers and authority as
a question of law, with no deference to the
agency's view of the law. The correct ion-oferror standard will be applied to such an issue
and the agency's statutory interpretation will
be upheld only if it is concluded to be not erroneous. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d
573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Under Subsection (4)(d), a court may grant
relief based upon an agency's erroneous interpretation of law. This incorporates the correction-of-error standard previously applied by
the Utah courts in cases involving agency interpretations of law. Savage Indus., Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah
1991).
The legislature in enacting Subsection (4) intended that the same standard used for determining the harmfulness of error in appeals
from judicial proceedings should apply to reviews of agency actions. Under this standard,
an error will be harmless if it is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-oferror standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory
term. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Mor-Flo
Indus., Inc. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992).
An agency's statutory construction should
only be given deference when there is a grant
of discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made in the
statute or implied from the statutory language.
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
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814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Uintah Oil Ass'n v.
County Bd. of Equalization, 853 P.2d 894
(Utah 1993).
Constitutional questions are characterized
as questions of law, and under Subsection
(4)(d), agency determinations of general law —
which include interpretations of the state and
federal constitutions — are to be reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, giving no
deference to the agency's decision. Questar
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 817
P.2d 316 (Utah 1991).
Under Subsection (4)(a), the Court of Appeals reviews the constitutionality of the statute upon which an agency's action is based
without deference, as a conclusion of law.
Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Because courts should uphold agency rules if
they are reasonable and rational, courts should
also uphold reasonable and rational departures
from those rules by the agency absent a showing that the departure violated some other
right. Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842
P.2d 876 (Utah 1992).
Deference is given to an agency's statutory
construction only when there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language
in question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language.
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-oferror standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory
term. Horton v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
842 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Since § 35-4-5(b)(l) provides that a claimant
is ineligible for unemployment benefits if the
individual is "discharged for just cause . . . if
so found by the commission," the appellate
court reviews the action of the Board of Review
of the Utah Industrial Commission under Subsection (4)(h)(i) of this section for reasonableness. Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp.
Sec., 854 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Interpretation of statutory term.
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-oferror standard is used in reviewing an agency's
interpretation or application of a statutory
term such as "injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease" in § 35-2-105. However,
when the legislature either expressly or implicitly grants the agency discretion to interpret or apply a statutory term, a court will review the agency's interpretation or application
under a reasonableness standard. Luckau v.
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d
811 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
—Questions of law.
Intermediate deference should be granted to
an agency's interpretation or application of
specific laws when the legislature has explicitly or implicitly delegated discretion to the

agency to interpret or apply that law. If there
is no explicit delegation of discretion, and the
issues are questions of constitutional law and
statutory construction on which the commission's experience and expertise will be of no
real assistance, the standard of intermediate
deference should not be applied. Zissi v. State
Tax Comm'r, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992).
Substantial evidence test.
In applying the "substantial evidence test,"
the appellate court reviews the "whole record"
before the court, and this review is distinguishable from both a de novo review and the "any
competent evidence" standard of review. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The "substantial evidence test" of Subsection
(4)(g) grants appellate courts greater latitude
in reviewing the record than was previously
granted under the Utah Employment Security
Act's "any evidence of substance test." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"Substantial evidence" is more than a mere
"scintilla" of evidence, though something less
than the weight of the evidence. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).
The party challenging the findings must
marshal all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the supporting
facts, the agency's findings are not supported
by substantial evidence. First Nat'l Bank v.
County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163
(Utah 1990); Intermountain Health Care, Inc.
v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Substantial prejudice.
Agency decision revoking social worker's license was reversed and his case was remanded
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford
him an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him resulted in "substantial
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
The "substantial prejudice" phrase in Subsection (4) relates to the damage or harm suffered by the person seeking review and was
written to ensure that a court will not issue
advisory opinions reviewing agency action
when no true controversy has resulted from
that action. The phrase does not relate to the
degree of deference a court must give an
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agency decision. Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
Whole record t e s t
The "whole record test" necessarily requires
that a party challenging the board's findings of
fact must marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
Under the "whole record test," a court must
consider not only the evidence supporting the
board's factual findings, but also the evidence
that fairly detracts from the weight of the
board's evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Cited in Law Offices of David Paul White &
Assocs. v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 20 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial
Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Fred Meyer v. Industrial
Comm'n, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810
P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); In re SAM Oil,
Inc., 817 P.2d 299 (Utah 1991V, Salt Lake
County ex rel. County Bd. of Equalization v.
State Tax Comm'n, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah 1991);
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Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah
1991); Johnson-Bowles Cc. v. Department of
Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d
448 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992); Ferro v.
Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah
1992); Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Giesbrecht v. Board of
Review, 828 P.2d 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); Stewart v. Board of Review,
831 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Holland v.
State Office of Educ, 834 P.2d 596 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992); Gibson v. Department of Emp. Sec., 840 P.2d 780 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl.
Quality, 843 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Board of Equalization v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 892 (Utah 1993);
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.
v. Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct.
App. 1993); Thonip Bros. Constr. v. Auditing
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv.
Rep. 39 (1993).

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 273.
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

F. "Handicap" means a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of an
individual's major life activities.
1. Being regarded as having a handicap is equivalent to being handicapped or having a handicap.
2. Having a record of an impairment substantially
limiting one or more major life activities is equivalent to being handicapped or having a handicap.
3. Major life activity means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
employment.
4. An individual will be considered substantially
limited in the major life activity of employment or
working if the individual is likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining, or advancing in employment because of a handicap.
5. Has a record of such an impairment means has a
history of, or has been regarded as having, a mental
or physical impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activity.
6. Is regarded as having an impairment means:
a. has a physical or mental impairment that does
not substantially limit major life activities but is
treated as constituting such a limitation;
b. has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result
of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment;
or
c. has none of the impairments listed in the definition of physical or mental impairment above but is
treated as having sucn an impairment.
G. "He, His, Him, or Himself* shall refer to either
sex.
H. 'Investigator" shall mean the individual designated by the Commission or Director to investigate
complaints alleging discriminatory or prohibited employment practices.
I. "Qualified handicapped individual" means a
handicapped individual who with reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the
job in question.
J. "Reasonable accommodation": For the purpose of
enforcement of these rules and regulations the following criteria will be utilized to determine a reasonable
accommodation.
1. An employer shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the employer can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of its program
2. Reasonable accommodation may include:
a. making facilities used by the employees readily
accessible to and useable by handicapped individuals;
and
b. job restructuring, modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, and
other similar actions.
3. In determining pursuant to Rule R560-1-2.J.1
whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of an employer, factors to
be considered include:
a. the overall size of the employer's program with
respect to number of employees, number and type of
facilities, and size of budget;
b. the type of the employer's operation, including
the composition and structure of the employer's work
force; and
c. the nature and cost of the accommodation
needed.
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4. An employer may not deny an employment opportunity to a qualified handicapped employee or applicant if the basis for the denial is the need to make
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
limitations of the employee or applicant.
5. Each complaint will be handled on a case-by-case
basis because of the variable nature of handicap and
potential accommodation.
K. The Division adopts the federal EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment as specified in 29 CFR
Section 1604.11.
R560-1-3. Procedures—Request for Agency Action and Investigation File.
A. CONTENTS OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION
A request for agency action as specified in Section
34-35-7.1, U.C.A., shall be filed at the Division office
on a form designated by the Division. The completed
form shall include all information required by Section
63-46b-3(3), U.C.A.
B. FILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION
1. A request for agency action must be filed within
180 day8 after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred.
2. A request for agency action shall be filed either
by personal delivery or regular mail addressed to the
Division's office in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3. Investigators and any other persons designated
by the Commission, shall be available to assist in the
drafting and filing of requests for agency action at the
Division's office during normal business hours.
C. RESPONSE/ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR
AGENCY ACTION
1. The Division shall mail a copy of the request for
agency action to the charging party and the respondent/employer within ten working days of the filing
of the request for agency action.
2. The respondent must answer the allegations of
discrimination or prohibited employment practice set
out in the request for agency action in writing within
ten working days of receipt of the request for agency
action. The response/answer shall be mailed to the
Division office.
D. AMENDMENT OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY
ACTION
1. All allegations of discrimination or prohibited
employment practice set out in the request for agency
action may be amended, either by the Commission or
the charging party prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing and the respondent may amend its
answer. Amendments made during or after an evidentiary hearing may be made only with the permission of the presiding officer. The Commission shall
permit liberal amendment of requests for agency action and filing of supplemental requests for agency
action in order to accomplish the purpose of the Act.
2. Amendments or a supplemental request for
agency action shall be in writing, or on forms furnished by the Division, signed and verified. Copies
shall be filed in the same manner as in the case of
original requests for agency action.
3. Amendments or a supplemental request for
agency action shall be served on the respondent as in
the case of an original request for agency action.
4. A request for agency action or a supplemental
request for agency action may be withdrawn by the
charging party prior to the issuance of a final order.
E. MAILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION
The mailing specified in Section 63-46b-3(3),
U.C.A., shall be performed by the Division and the
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persons known to have a direct interest in the requested agency action as specified in Section
63-46b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party
and the respondent^employer.
F. CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR
PURPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.l(l)-(5), U.C.A., are
an informal process with no hearing and are governed by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement
conferences
scheduled
pursuant
to
Section
34-35-7.l(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings.
G. PRESIDING OFFICER
For those procedures specified in Section
34-35-7.1(l)-(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be
the Director or the Director's designee. The presiding
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section
34-35-7.K6M11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the
Commission.

R560-1-6

tween the increased risk of future injury and the
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk.
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the defense of increased cost of insurance premium must
show with verified documentary evidence that a significant insurance premium increase would occur if
the charging party were hired or remained in the
position at issue.
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on
federal case law regarding discrimination in interpreting the Act in cases where the federal law being
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and
where state law interpretation is non-existent.
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Purpose of Utah Administrative Procedures A c t
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section
34-35-7.K6M10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative
hearing which shall occur following the investigation
process referred to in Section 34-35-7.l(l)-(5), U.C.A.
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the requirements imposed by Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A.

R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making
and Review.
The following rules pertain to the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1, U.C.A.
A. For purposes of requesting review of the initial
Determination and Order, the following provisions
and those of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A., shall apply:
1. The initial Determination and Order of the Divi- R560-1-6. Declaratory Orders.
sion, after the completion of an investigation on a
A. PURPOSE
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the DirecAs required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule protor. The Director may request that the Commission's vides the procedures for submission, review, and dislegal staff review an investigatory file and make a position of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders govof the initial Determination and Order. The Director erning or issued by the agency.
may refer a request for agency action back to an inB. PETITION FORM AND FILING
vestigator for further investigation when necessary.
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to
2. Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4.A.1 the Director, who shall mark the petition with the
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final date of receipt.
Commission Orders until either the time to file a
2. The petition shall:
written request to the Director for an evidentiary
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency
hearing to review de novo the Director's Determina- Declaratory Order;
tion and Order has expired or until the Order is af(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be refirmed in a Commission Order on review per Section viewed;
63-46b-12, U.C.A.
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances
3. A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de
in which applicability is to be reviewed;
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30
review, addressing in particular why the review
days of the date of the initial Determination and Orshould not be considered frivolous;
der.
(e) include an address and telephone where the pe4. A request for an evidentiary hearing must state
a reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will titioner can be contacted during regular work days;
(0 declare whether the petitioner has participated
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed concerning the same issue within the past 12 months;
differently. In most cases, the need to cross-examine and
(g) be signed by the petitioner.
the individuals who have submitted affidavits supC.
REVIEWABILITY
portive of the initial finding or determination of the
The agency shall not review a petition for a DeclarCommission will be considered a valid reason for
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission. atory Order that is:
1. not within the jurisdiction and competence of the
5. Either party may file a written request for review of the presiding officer's Order in accordance agency;
2. trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial; or
with Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A.
3. otherwise excluded by state or federal law.
B. Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimiD. PETITION REVIEW AND DISPOSITION
nation, whether risk of future injury or increased cost
1. The Director shall promptly review and consider
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of the petition and may:
(a) meet with the petitioner;
the Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case
(b) consult with Legal Counsel; or
basis subject to the following limitations:
(c) take any action consistent with law that the
1. The respondent/employer seeking to use the defense of risk of future injury must provide reliable agency deems necessary to provide the petition ademedical evidence showing a causal connection be- quate review and due consideration.
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persons known to have a direct interest in the requested agency action as specified in Section
63-46b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party
and the respondent/employer.
F. CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR
PURPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.l(l)-(5), U.C.A., are
an informal process with no hearing and are governed by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement
conferences
scheduled
pursuant
to Section
34-35-7. l(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings.
G. PRESIDING OFFICER
For those procedures specified in Section
34-35-7.1(l)-(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be
the Director or the Director's designee. The presiding
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section
34-35-7.K6M11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the
Commission.

R560-1-6

tween the increased risk of future injury and the
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk.
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the defense of increased cost of insurance premium must
show with verified documentary evidence that a significant insurance premium increase would occur if
the charging party were hired or remained in the
position at issue.
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on
federal case law regarding discrimination in interpreting the Act in cases where the federal law being
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and
where state law interpretation is non-existent.
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Purpose of Utah Administrative Procedures A c t
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section
34-35-7.1(6)-(10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative
hearing which shall occur following the investigation
process referred to in Section 34-35-7.1UM5), U.C.A.
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the requirements imposed by Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A.

R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making
and Review.
The following rules pertain to the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1, U.C.A.
A. For purposes of requesting review of the initial
Determination and Order, the following provisions
and those of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A., shall apply:
1. The initial Determination and Order of the Divi- R560-1-6. Declaratory Orders.
sion, after the completion of an investigation on a
A. PURPOSE
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the DirecAs required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule protor. The Director may request that the Commission's vides the procedures for submission, review, and dislegal staff review an investigatory file and make a position of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders govof the initial Determination and Order. The Director erning or issued by the agency.
may refer a request for agency action back to an inB. PETITION FORM AND FILING
vestigator for further investigation when necessary.
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to
2. Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4.A.1 the Director, who shall mark the petition with the
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final date of receipt.
Commission Orders until either the time to file a
2. The petition shall:
written request to the Director for an evidentiary
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency
hearing to review de novo the Director's DeterminaDeclaratory Order;
tion and Order has expired or until the Order is af(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be refirmed in a Commission Order on review per Section
viewed;
63-46b-12, U.C.A.
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances
3. A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de
in which applicability is to be reviewed;
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30
days of the date of the initial Determination and Or- review, addressing in particular why the review
should not be considered frivolous;
der.
(e) include an address and telephone where the pe4. A request for an evidentiary hearing must state
a reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will titioner can be contacted during regular work days;
(f) declare whether the petitioner has participated
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed concerning the same issue within the past 12 months;
differently. In most cases, the need to cross-examine and
(g) be signed by the petitioner.
the individuals who have submitted affidavits supC. REVIEWABILITY
portive of the initial finding or determination of the
The agency shall not review a petition for a DeclarCommission will be considered a valid reason for
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission. atory Order that is:
1. not within the jurisdiction and competence of the
5. Either party may file a written request for review of the presiding officer's Order in accordance agency;
2. trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial; or
with Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A.
3. otherwise excluded by state or federal law.
B. Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimiD. PETITION REVIEW AND DISPOSITION
nation, whether risk of future injury or increased cost
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to
1. The Director shall promptly review and consider
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of the petition and may:
the Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case
(a) meet with the petitioner;
basis subject to the following limitations:
(b) consult with Legal Counsel; or
1. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de(c) take any action consistent with law that the
fense of risk of future injury must provide reliable agency deems necessary to provide the petition ademedical evidence showing a causal connection be- quate review and due consideration.
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persons known to have a direct interest in the requested agency action as specified in Section
63-46b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party
and the respondent/employer.
F. CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR
PURPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(l)-(5), U.C.A., are
an informal process with no hearing and are governed by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement
conferences
scheduled
pursuant
to
Section
34-35-7. l(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings.
G. PRESIDING OFFICER
For those procedures specified in Section
34-35-7.1(l)-(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be
the Director or the Director's designee. The presiding
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section
34-35-7.1(6)-(11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the
Commission.
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making
and Review.
The following rules pertain to the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1, U.C.A.
A. For purposes of requesting review of the initial
Determination and Order, the following provisions
and those of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A., shall apply:
1. The initial Determination and Order of the Division, after the completion of an investigation on a
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the Director. The Director may request that the Commission's
legal staff review an investigatory file and make a
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance
of the initial Determination and Order. The Director
may refer a request for agency action back to an investigator for further investigation when necessary.
2. Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4.A.1
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final
Commission Orders until either the time to file a
written request to the Director for an evidentiary
hearing to review de novo the Director's Determination and Order has expired or until the Order is affirmed in a Commission Order on review per Section
63-46b-12, U.C.A.
3. A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30
days of the date of the initial Determination and Order.
4. A request for an evidentiary hearing must state
a reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed
differently. In most cases, the need to cross-examine
the individuals who have submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of the
Commission will be considered a valid reason for
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission.
5. Either party may file a written request for review of the presiding officer's Order in accordance
with Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A.
B. Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimination, whether risk of future injury or increased cost
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of
the Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case
basis subject to the following limitations:
1. The respondent/employer seeking to use the defense of risk of future injury must provide reliable
medical evidence showing a causal connection be-
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tween the increased risk of future injury and the
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk.
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the defense of increased cost of insurance premium must
show with verified documentary evidence that a significant insurance premium increase would occur if
the charging party were hired or remained in the
position at issue.
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on
federal case law regarding discrimination in interpreting the Act in cases where the federal law being
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and
where state law interpretation is non-existent.
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Purpose of Utah Administrative Procedures A c t
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section
34-35-7.1(6)-(10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative
hearing which shall occur following the investigation
process referred to in Section 34-35-7. K1M5), U.C.A.
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the requirements imposed by Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A.
R560-1-6. Declaratory Orders.
A. PURPOSE
As required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule provides the procedures for submission, review, and disposition of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on
the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders governing or issued by the agency.
B. PETITION FORM AND FIUNG
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to
the Director, who shall mark the petition with the
date of receipt.
2. The petition shall:
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency
Declaratory Order;
(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be reviewed;
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances
in which applicability is to be reviewed;
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability
review, addressing in particular why the review
should not be considered frivolous;
(e) include an address and telephone where the petitioner can be contacted during regular work days;
(f) declare whether the petitioner has participated
in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding
concerning the same issue within the past 12 months;
and
(g) be signed by the petitioner.
C. REVIEWABILITY
The agency shall not review a petition for a Declaratory Order that is:
1. not within the jurisdiction and competence of the
agency;
2. trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial; or
3. otherwise excluded by state or federal law.
D. PETITION REVIEW AND DISPOSITION
1. The Director shall promptly review and consider
the petition and may:
(a) meet with the petitioner,
(b) consult with Legal Counsel; or
(c) take any action consistent with law that the
agency deems necessary to provide the petition adequate review and due consideration.
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Rule 9

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS
Driver's license suspension.
Supersedeas bond
-Damages recoverable.
Speculative
—Failure to
file
Effect on lis pendens.
purpose.
-^ .
, ..
.
Dnver a license suspens.on
Absent a strong showing of the likelihood of
success on the merits, the balancing of the fac
tors to be considered in assessing an apphcation for a stay of a driver's license suspension
under § 41-6-44.10 (implied consent) tips in favor of denying a stay due to important public
policy implications. Jensen v. Schwendiman,
744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Supersedeas bond.
—Damages recoverable.
Speculative.
Where supersedeas bond was filed by defendant which allowed him to retain real property
pending appeal, which appeal was unsuccessful, plaintiff could recover for temporarily being deprived of use of land. Where the land in

question had been used for years for grazing
""developed sagebrush ground, measure w a s the va,ue of such land
rather than the
value
° f t h e ! a n d {" agricultural purposes
even tnou n
6 plaintiff had announced that he
would use the land for agricultural purposes
and in fact his
subsequent grantee did so use
the land. Prospective profits to be derived from
a business which is not yet established but one
i a t i o n a r e gen erally too unm e r e , jn c o n t e
£ amJ
J a t i v e to f o l ^ a hJis for r e .
and was

c0
p

Jenkins v

M

m

U u h 480

26Q

«J coo (1953)

—Failure to file.
E f f e c t o n Us

pendens.

F a i l u r e to f u r n i s h a superS edeas

bond had no
lis pendens during the time after judgment and pending appeal. Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills,
59
° P 2 d 1 2 4 4 ( U t a h 1979)—Purpose.
The purpose of a supersedeas bond is not to
stay the accrual of obligations but to stay the
execution or enforcement thereof. Lund v.
Lund, 6 Utah 2d 425, 315 P.2d 856 (1957).
effect o n t h e n o t i c e g i v e n bv a recorded

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 364 to 373.

C.J.S. — 4A CJ.S. Appeal and Error §§ 625
to 679.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *= 458.

Rule 9. Docketing statement.
(a) Time for filing. Within 21 days after a notice of appeal, cross-appeal, or
a petition for review is filed, the appellant, cross-appellate, or petitioner shall
file a docketing statement with the clerk of the appellate court. An original
and three copies of the docketing statement shall be filed with the court.
(b) Purpose of docketing statement. The docketing statement is not a
brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions. It is used by
the appellate court in assigning cases to the Supreme Court or to the Court of
Appeals when both have jurisdiction, in making certifications to the Supreme
Court, in classifying cases for determining the priority to be accorded them, in
making summary dispositions when appropriate, and in making calendar
assignments.
(c) Content of docketing statement. The docketing statement shall contain the following information in the order set forth below:
(1) The date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; the date of
all motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; the date and effect of all orders disposing of such
motions; and the date the notice of appeal or the petition for review was
filed.
(2) (A) The specific rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction
on the appellate court to decide the appeal, the petition for review, or,
in the case of an interlocutory appeal, the date of the appellate court
order allowing the appeal and the issues which may be appealed
pursuant to the granting of the interlocutory appeal.
(B) If an appeal is from an order in a multiple-party or a multipleclaim case, and the judgment has been certified as a final judgment
by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
(i) a statement of what claims and parties remain before the
trial court for adjudication and
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(ii) a statement of whether the facts underlying the appeal are
sufficiently similar to the facts underlying the claims remaining
before the trial court to constitute res judicata on those claims.
(3) A concise statement of the nature of the proceeding, e.g., "this appeal is from a final judgment or decree of the
court" or
"this petition is to review an order of
administrative
agency."
(4) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the questions presented.
(5) The issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary detail. The questions
should not be repetitious. General conclusions such as "the judgment of
the trial court is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable.
For each issue appellant must state the applicable standard of appellate
review and cite supporting authority.
(6) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the
Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals" should appear immediately under the title of the document, i.e.,
"Docketing Statement."
(7) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the
Court of Appeals, the appellant may set forth concisely in not more than
two pages why the Supreme Court should decide the case. The Supreme
Court may, for example, consider whether the case presents or involves
one or more of the following:
(A) a substantial constitutional issue not yet decided and, if so,
what the issue or issues are;
(B) an issue of first impression in the state and of substantial importance in the administration of justice;
(C) a conflict in Court of Appeals decisions that needs to be resolved by the Supreme Court;
(D) any other persuasive reason why the Supreme Court should
resolve the issue.
(8) Citations to statutes, rules, or cases believed to be determinative of
the respective issues stated.
(9) A reference to all related or prior appeals in the case. If the reference is to a prior appeal, the appropriate citation should be given.
(d) Necessary attachments. Attached to each copy of the docketing statement shall be a copy of the following:
(1) The judgment or order sought to be reviewed;
(2) Any opinion or findings;
(3) All motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), and
59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and orders disposing of such motions;
and
(4) The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for the filing
of a notice of appeal.
(e) Attachment to indicate date filed. The attachments required by this
rule must bear a clear representation of the original date of filing by means of
the trial courts filing seal or mark or a copy conformed to the original by the
trial court.
(f) Response to statement regarding assignment. If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, the appellee
may file a response to the appellant's contentions in subparagraph (c)(7). The
response may support or oppose the appellant's position, shall not be more
than two pages long, and shall be filed within 10 days after service of the
docketing statement.
(g) Consequences of failure to comply. Docketing statements which fail
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Rule 10

to comply with this rule will not be accepted. Failure to comply may result in
dismissal of the appeal or the petition.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The content
the docket statement has been slightly reorAered to first state information governing the
jurisdiction of the court.
The docket statement and briefs contain a
new section requiring a statement of the applicable standard of review, with citation of supporting authority, for each issue presented on
appeal.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, in Subdivision
0f

(a) substituted "three" for "seven" and "with
the court" for "in the Supreme Court" in the
second sentence and deleted the third sentence,
requiring an original and four copies to be filed
in the Court of Appeals, and in Subdivision
(c)(2) added the (A) and (B) designations and
substituted all the language of Subdivision
(2KB) after "multiple-claim case" for "Particular attention should be paid to the requirements of Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," making a related stylistic change.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
t

—Authority for original appellate jurisdiction.
Failure to comply.
Content
-Authority for original appellate jurisdiction.
In all cases appealed after January 1, 1987,
reference to § 78-2-2 will be considered insufficient; instead the appropriate subsection must
be included to alert the Supreme Court that it

has original appellate jurisdiction over the
case. Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735
P 2 d 3 3 ( U t a h 1987)
Failure to comply.
Docketing statements must fully comply
with this
™le- Failure to comply will result in
dismissal of the appeal, particularly when
counsel ignores the court's request that the
statement be properly amended. Brooks v. Department of Emp. Sec, 736 P.2d 241 (Utah
1987).

Rule 10. Motion for summary disposition.
(a) Time for tiling; grounds for motion. Within 10 days after the docketing statement is served, a party may move:
(1) To dismiss the appeal or the petition for review on the basis that the
appellate court has no jurisdiction; or
(2) To affirm the order or judgment which is the subject of review on
the basis that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to merit
further proceedings and consideration by the appellate court; or
(3) To reverse the order or judgment which is the subject of review on
the basis of manifest error.
(b) Number of copies; form of motion. An original and seven copies of a
motion made pursuant to this rule shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. An original and four copies shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals. The motion shall be in the form prescribed by Rule 23.
(c) Filing of response. The party moved against shall have 10 days from
the service of such a motion in which to file a response. An original response
and seven copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original response
and four copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals.
(d) Submission of motion; suspension of further proceedings. Upon
the filing of a response or the expiration of time therefor, the motion shall be
submitted to the court for consideration and an appropriate order. The time
for taking other steps in the appellate procedure is suspended pending disposition of a motion to affirm or reverse or dismiss.
(e) Ruling of court. The court, upon its own motion, and on such notice as
it directs, may dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the court lacks
jurisdiction; or may summarily affirm the judgment or order which is the
subject of review, if it plainly appears that no substantial question is presented; or may summarily reverse in cases of manifest error.
(f) Deferral of ruling. As to any issue raised by a motion for summary
disposition, the court may defer its ruling until plenary presentation and
consideration of the case.
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TITLE III.
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES.
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained;
intervention.
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commission, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order.
The term "petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend,
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the respondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each
case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah shall be
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single
petitioner.
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state
is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding
who have been served.
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Means of filing petition.
Time for filing.
Cited.
Means of filing petition.
Commencing petitioner's appeal requires filing the petition with the clerk. Filing a document requires that the document be deposited
with the court clerk, and not with the post office or other means of delivery. Silva v Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Service upon counsel or other parties is required by this rule, and failure to do so may be

grounds for appropriate sanctions. However,
service of a petition for review or notice of appeal on an opposing party does not substitute
for nor accomplish the act of filing that appeal
with the clerk. Silva v. Department of Emp.
Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Time for filing.
The appeal time commences when the final
agency order issues and not when allegedly received by a party. Silva v. Department of Emp.
Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The 30-day time period for filing an appeal is
not extended because the agency's decision was
mailed to petitioner and was not received by
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petitioner until days after its service. Silva v.
Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

Rule 18

Cited in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824
P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 553 et seq.
A.L.R. — Court review of bar examiners' decision on applicant's examination, 39 A.L.R.3d
719.
Standing of civic or property owners' association to challenge zoning board decision (as aggrieved party), 8 A.L.R.4th 1087.
Standing of zoning board of appeals or simi-

lar body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13
A.L.R.4th 1130.
Judicial review of administrative ruling affecting conduct or outcome of publicly regulated horse, dog, or motor vehicle race, 36
A.L.R.4th 1169.
Key Numbers. — Administrative Law «=
651 et seq.

Rules 15, 16. Reserved.
Compiler's Notes. — Rule 15, relating to
the contents of the record on review, and Rule
16, prescribing the procedure for filing a record

for review, are repealed effective October 1,
1992.

Rule 17. Stay pending review.
Application for a stay of a decision or order of an agency pending direct
review in the appellate court shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to
the agency if the agency is authorized by law to grant a stay. If a motion for
such relief is made to the appellate court, the motion shall show that application to the agency for the relief sought is not practicable, or that application
has been made to the agency and denied, with the reasons given by it for
denial. The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the
facts relied upon, and if the facts are subject to dispute, the motion shall be
supported by affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof. With the
motion shall be filed those parts of the record relevant to the relief sought.
Reasonable notice of the filing of the motion and any hearing shall be given to
all parties to the proceeding in the appellate court. The appellate court may
condition relief under this rule upon the filing of a bond or other appropriate
security. The motion shall be filed with the clerk and normally will be considered by the court, but in exceptional cases where such procedure would be
impracticable due to the requirements of time, the application may be considered by a single justice or judge of the court.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of state
statutory provision forbidding court to stay,
pending review, judgment or order revoking or

suspending professional, trade, or occupational
license, 42 A.L.R.4th 516.

Rule 18. Applicability of other rules to review.
All provisions of these rules are applicable to review of decisions or orders of
agencies, except that Rules 3 through 8 are not applicable. As used in any
applicable rule, the term "appellant" includes a petitioner in proceedings to
review the orders of an agency, commission or board. The term "appellee"
includes the respondent, which may be the agency, commission, or board. The
term "clerk of the trial court" includes the chief executive officer of the
agency, commission, or board or the officer's designee.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- commission or board" for "agency orders" in
ment, effective October 1, 1992, deleted "and the second sentence, and added the third and
11 through 13" after "3 through 8" in the first fourth sentences,
sentence, substituted "the orders of an agency,
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papers shall be signed by counsel of record or by a party who is not represented by counsel.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend(e) is added to Rule 21 to consolidate various ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the last
signature provisions formerly found in other sentence in Subdivision (b).
sections of the rules.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 316 to 322.
C.J.S. — 4A C.JS. Appeal and Error
§ 594(1) et seq.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *=
327(6).

Rule 22. Computation and enlargement of time,
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed by
these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of
the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to
run shall not be included. The last day of the period shall be included, unless
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period
extends until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded
in the computation. As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes days designated as holidays by the state or federal governments.
(b) Enlargement of time.
(1) Motions for an enlargement of time for filing briefs beyond the time
permitted by stipulation of the parties under Rule 26(a) are not favored.
(2) The court for good cause shown may upon motion enlarge the time
prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may permit
an act to be done after the expiration of such time, but the court may not
enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal or a petition for review from
an order of an administrative agency, except as specifically authorized by
law. For the purpose of this rule, good cause includes, but is not limited
to, the complexity of the case on appeal, engagement in other litigation,
and extreme hardship to counsel.
(3) A motion for an enlargement of time shall be filed prior to the
expiration of the time for which the enlargement is sought. If the enlargement of time is greater than six days, the motion shall be filed at least
five days prior to expiration of time for which enlargement is sought,
unless it is shown that the facts which form the basis for the motion:
(A) did not exist earlier or
(B) were not known earlier and with the exercise of diligence could
not have been known earlier.
(4) A motion for enlargement of time shall state:
(A) with particularity the good cause for granting the motion;
(B) whether the movant has previously been granted an enlargement of time and, if so, the number and duration of such enlargements;
(C) when the time will expire for doing the act for which the enlargement of time is sought; and
(D) the date on which the act for which the enlargement of time is
sought will be completed.
(5) (A) If the good cause relied upon is engagement in other litigation,
the motion shall:
(i) identify such litigation by caption, number and court;
(ii) describe the action of the court in the other litigation on a
motion for continuance;
(iii) state the reasons why the other litigation should take
precedence over the subject appeal;

399

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 23

(iv) state the reasons why associated counsel cannot prepare
the brief for timely filing or relieve the movant in the other
litigation; and
(v) identify any other relevant circumstances.
(B) If the good cause relied upon is the complexity of the appeal,
the movant shall state the reasons why the appeal is so complex that
an adequate brief cannot reasonably be prepared by the due date.
(C) If the good cause relied upon is extreme hardship to counsel,
the movant shall state in detail the nature of the hardship.
(D) All facts supporting good cause shall be stated with specificity.
Generalities, such as "the motion is not for the purpose of delay" or
"counsel is engaged in other litigation," are insufficient.
(c) Ex parte motion. Except as to enlargements of time for filing and
service of briefs under Rule 26(a), a party may file one ex parte motion for
enlargement of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has been
previously granted, if the time has not already expired for doing the act for
which the enlargement is sought, and if the motion otherwise complies with
the requirements and limitations of paragraph (b) of this rule.
(d) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party is required
or permitted to do an act within a prescribed period after service of a paper
and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — A motion to dance with the pnonty of the case and the date
enlarge time must be filed prior to the expira- of the completion of briefing Delays m the
tion of the time sought to be enlarged A spe- completion of briefing will likely delay the date
cific date on wh^n the act will be completed 0 f oral argument
must be provided The court may grant an exAmendment Notes. — The 1992 amendtension of time after the original deadline has m e n t > effective October 1, 1992, in Subdivision
expired, but the motion to enlarge the time ( b ) | a d d e d t h e desi gnations and Subdivisions
must be filed poor to the deadline.
( 1 ) a n d ( 5 ) a d d e d t h e seCQnd ^ ^ ^
l n Sub_
Counsel should note that there is no penalty d i v i g i o n 8 ( 2 ) a n d ( 3 ) s u b s t l t u t e d « ^
^ ^
for seeking an enlargement of time in filing r „
„ 0 , ,
/A^A\
J
J
f o r r asons i n
and
m
briefs However, both appellate courts placl
, f
^T^w
^
appeals in the oral argument queue in accor- s t y h s t l c c h a n * e s t h ™ g * o u t Subdivision (4).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Effect of death of party to divorce
proceeding pending appeal on time allowed for
appeal, 33 A L R 4th 47.

Rule 23. Motions.
(a) Content of motion. Unless another form is elsewhere prescribed by
these rules, an application for an order or other relief shall be made by filing a
motion for such order or relief with proof of service on all other parties. The
motion shall contain or be accompanied by the following:
(1) A specific and clear statement of the relief sought;
(2) A particular statement of the factual grounds;
(3) If the motion is for other than an enlargement of time, a memorandum of points and authorities in support; and
(4) Affidavits and papers, where appropriate.
(b) Response. Any party may file a response in opposition to a motion
within 10 days after service of the motion; however, the court may, for good
cause shown, dispense with, shorten or extend the time for responding to any
motion.
(c) Reply. The moving party may file a reply only to answer new matter
raised in the response. The court shall not postpone action on the motion to
await the reply.
(d) Determination of motions for procedural orders. Notwithstanding
the provisions of paragraph (a) of this rule as to motions generally, motions
for procedural orders which do not substantially affect the rights of the parties
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remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal
that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed
within 20 days after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10
days after the response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. Upon consideration of the motion, affidavits, and
memoranda, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to the claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that the
attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the
court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand,
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties
or upon the court's motion.
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall
conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable
after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the
fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial
court shall enter written findings of fact.
(0 Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required
by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court
has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings
before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk
of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon
the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the
trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule
for briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1, 1992.)

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, with page references.
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(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority for each issue.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy,
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with
the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (6), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered,
and received or rejected.
(0 Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form.
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of
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fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document
subject to construction, etc ) shall also be included in the addendum
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (f) of this rule
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of
the appellant
d) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of
another Parties may similarly join in reply briefs
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992)
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief
must now contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of
review and citation of supporting authority

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, added the
third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made styhstic changes in Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutional arguments
Contents
Argument
-Inappropriate language
Issues raised
-Statement of facts with citation to record
Failure to contain
Standard of review
Failure to file
—Defective appeal
Properly documented argument
Reply brief
Cited
Constitutional argument,.
In order to make an argument for an innovative interpretation of a state constitutional
provision textually similar to a federal provi-

sion, the following points should be developed
* n d suPP°*e<* with authority and analysis
First, counsel should oner analysis of the
unique context in which Utah's constitution
developed with regard to the issue at hand
Second, counsel should demonstrate that state
appellate courts regularly interpret even
textually similar state constitutional provisions in a manner different from federal mterpretations of the United States Constitution
anc t n a t
*
it 1S entirely proper to do so in our
federal system Third, citation should be made
to authority from other states supporting the
particular construction urged by counsel State
v Bobo 8 0 3 P 2 d 1 2 6 8
< U t a h C t APP 1 9 9 0 )
Contents.
A brief must contain some support for each
contention State v Wareham, 772 P 2d 960
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(Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Extensive quotations from numerous case
authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot
substitute for the development of appellate arguments explicitly tied to the record. West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Appellant's brief was clearly deficient under
the provisions of this rule because it failed to
set forth a coherent statement of issues and the
appropriate standard of review for each issue
with supporting authority, the "issues" where
listed did not correlate with the substance of
the brief, the statement of the case not only
omitted reference to the course of proceedings
and disposition in the trial court, but failed to
provide a statement of the relevant facts properly documented by citations to the record, and
defendant's "argument" did not identify any
error by the trial court, refer to the facts or the
record, or cite applicable authority, much less
provide any meaningful factual or legal analysis. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
—Argument
Appellants' brief, containing less than a single page of assertions and no citations to the
record, no legal authorities, and no analysis
whatsoever, was not in compliance with this
rule, which requires the brief of an appellant to
contain an argument. Christensen v. Munns,
812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Court declined to consider argument that
was not adequately briefed. See State v. Yates,
834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
—Inappropriate language.
Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind has no place in an
appellate brief and is of no assistance in attempting to resolve any legitimate issues presented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296
(Utah 1986).
—Issues raised.
—Statement of facts with citation to
record.
Failure to contain.
The Supreme Court need not, and will not,
consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978).
The Supreme Court will assume the correctness of the judgment in a criminal trial if counsel on appeal does not comply with the requirements as to making a concise statement of
facts and citation of the pages in the record
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where they are supported. State v. Tucker, 657
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982).
If a party fails to make a concise statement
of the facts and citation of the pages in the
record where those facts are supported, the
court will assume the correctness of the judgment below. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746
P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Steele v.
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 204 Utah
Adv. Rep. 33 (Ct. App. 1993).
—Standard of review.
The standard of review requirement in Subdivision (a)(5) should not be ignored. The purpose of the requirement is to focus the briefs,
thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency
in the processing of appeals. Christensen v.
Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Failure to file.
—Defective appeal.
Where defendant was convicted of operating
a motor vehicle without insurance, and attempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to
file a brief or submit a transcript of the record,
there was no reversible error presented which
would permit the appellate court to reverse the
judgment. State v. Hansen, 540 P.2d 935 (Utah
1975).
Properly documented argument
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emotional, immaterial and inaccurate arguments
did not set forth a properly documented argument as required by this rule; therefore the
court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil
Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Reply brief.
As a general rule, an issue raised initially in
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal,
although the court, in its discretion, may decided a case upon any points that its proper
disposition may require, even if first raised in
a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).
Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 800
P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hoyt,
806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State ex
rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991); English v. Standard Optical
Co., 814 P.2d 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); Larson v. Overland ThriR & Loan,
818 P.2d 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State
v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Department of Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 684 to 690.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1311
et seq.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error <*= 755
to 807.
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This fort It affected by the Privacy Act of 1974; See Privacy Act statement before
D
completing this form.
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EEOC

Utah Anti-Discrimination Division

and EEOC

State or local Agency, if any
NAME

(Indicate

Mr.,

Ms.,

HOWE

Mrs.)

TELEPHONE (Include

Area Code)

(801) 278-8748

Mr. Stephen E. Hausknect
STREET ADDRESS

DATE OF BIRTH

CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE

2158 TERRA LINDA DR. SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124

03/03/29

NAMED IS THE EMPLOYER, LABOR ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYMENT AGENCY APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE,
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY WHO DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ME (ir more than one list below.)
TELEPHONE (Include

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, MEMBERS

NAME

(801) 322-7000

Cat D (501 +)

KENNECOTT CORP
STREET ADDRESS

COUNTY

CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE

1515 MINERAL SQUARE. SALT LAKE, UT 84147
TELEPHONE

NAME

CITY,

1515 MINERAL SQUARE
CAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION

•

RACE
•

•

(SAGE
(IT additional

Area Code)

COUNTY

SALT LAKE CITY UT
CDSEX
•

•

box(es))

RELIGION

DISABILITY

•

•

NATIONAL ORIGIN

DATE D I S C R I M I N A T I O N TOOK PLACE
EARLIEST(ADEA/EPA )
LA TEST (ALL)

03/25/92

OTHER (Specify)

•
ARE

03±

122-7000

STATE AND Z I P CODE

BASED ON (Check appropriate

COLOR

RETALIATION

THE PARTICULARS

NUMBER (Include

(801)

DON BABINCHAK
STREET ADDRESS

Area Code)

space

is needed, attach

extra

03/25/92

CONTINUING ACTION

sheet(s)):

PERSONAL HARM; I was terminated.
RESPONDENT'S REASON; I was accused of sexual harassment.
DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT; I believe that I have been illegally
discriminated against based upon my age, over 40, in violation of the
Age Discrimination Act of 1963> as amended: and the Utah
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965* a s amended, in that:
I am over 40.
Not having any training regarding sexual harassment or what constitutes
sexual harassment, and without any previous warnings, and having 38
years service with the respondent, I was terminated, being told that I
was guilty of sexual harassment.
I am aware of a male employee, under the age of 40, who was charged with
sexual harassment who has not been terminated and is still employed by
the respondent.
Therefore, I believe that I have been a victim of disparate treatment
based on my age, which I believe to be a discriu

£ 3 l also want this charge filed with the EEOC.
I will advise the agencies If I change my address or telephone
nunbar and I will cooperate fully with thea In the processing
of my charge In accordance with their procedures.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing Is true
and correct.

I swear or affirm that I have read t)>e above charge and that
It Is true to the beit of my knowledge, Information and bell
belief.
SIGNATURE O F C O M P L A I N A N T

t/L^u^K^u^SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME T H I S DATE
(Day, monttr; and year)

\
Charging Party
!E6C T£sf F M M 5 (6§/6i/§i)

(signature)

bUUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Hausknect,

Stephen

E

rtHi'S PERSON (check o n e )

r

H f l CLAIMS TO BEAGGRIEVED
•

IS FILING ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER

DATE OF ALLEGED VIOLATION

Mr. Don Babinchak
PERSONNEL DIRECTOR
KENNECOTT CORP
1515 MINERAL SQUARE
SALT LAKE, UT 84147

Earliest

Most Recent

' 03/25/92

03/25/92

P U C E OF ALLEGED VIOLATION

SALT LAKE, UT

L_

_J

EEOC CHARGE NUMBER

35C920418
FEPA CHARGE NUMBER

92-0393
NOTICE OF CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION IN JURISDICTIONS WHERE A FEP AGENCY WILL INITIALLY PROCESS
(See "EEOC Rules and Regulations" before completing this foraj

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT A CHARGE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER
•
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
S3 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
•

The Americans with Disabilities Act

HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY
•

(FEPAgency)

The EEOC and sent for initial processing to

S3 The U t a h A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n

D l v l s i o r i a n d sent to the EEOC for dual filing purposes.

(FEPAgency)
While EEOC has jurisdiction (upon the expiration of any deferral requirement i f this i s a T i t l e V I I charge) to
investigate this charge, EEOC may refrain from beginning an investigation and await the issuance of the Agency's
f i n a l findings and orders. These f i n a l findings and orders w i l l be given weight by EEOC i n making i t s own
determination as to whether or not reasonable cause exists to believe that the allegations made i n the charge
are true.
You are therefore encouraged to cooperate fully with the Agency. A l l facts and evidence provided by you to the
Agency i n the course of i t s proceedings w i l l be considered by the Commission when i t reviews the Agency's f i n a l
findings and orders. In many instances the Commission w i l l take no further action, thereby avoiding the necessity
of an investigation by both the Agency and the Commission. This likelihood is increased by your active cooperation
with the Agency.
5 3 As a party to the charge, you may request that EEOC review the f i n a l decision and order of the above named
Agency. For such a request to be honored, you must notify the Commission in writing within 15 days of your
receipt of the ^jency's final decision and order. I f the ^jency terminates i t s proceedings without issuing
a f i n a l finding and order, you w i l l be contacted further by the Commission. Regardless of whether the Agency
or the Commission processes the charge, the Recordkeeping and Non-Retaliation provisions of Title V I I and
the ADEA as explained in the "EEOC Rules and Regulations" apply.
For further correspondence on this matter, please use the charge number(s) shown.
•

An Equal Pay Act investigation (29 U.S.C. 206(d)) w i l l be conducted by the Commission concurrently with the
Agency's investigation of the charge.

[x] Enclosure: Copy of Charge
BASIS OF DISCRIMINATION

•

RACE

•

COLOR •

SEX

•

RELIGION •

NAT. ORIGIN •

RETALIATION

El AGE

•

DISABILITY

•

OTHER

CIRCUMSTANCES OF ALLEGED VIOLATION

See enclosed Form 5> Charge of Discrimination,

DATE

TYPED NAME/TITLE OF AUTHORIZED EEOC OFFICIAL

Charles D . Burtner,
05/12/92
EE66t^f P6AM I4I-A' (64/M/ii)

Director

SIGNATURE

Yo
RESPONDENT'S COPY

Tab 5

MAY t i 1992
V^IJ^'
Norman H Banperter
Go\ernor
John \

Medina
Dnector

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LABOR / ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
Street Address

Mailing Address

Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South Third Floor
Salt Lake City Utah 84111
Phone (801) 530 6801

Industrial Commission of Utah
Anti Discrimination Division
Salt Lake City Utah 84114 6640
FAX # (801) 530-7609

D. L. BABINCHAK
Stephen M Hadl/I
Chhairman
C
an
Thomas>1 R Carlson
C rrr1 ^ioner
Dixie L Min^rn
Commkasioner

Charging Party: Hausknect, Stephen E
Charge No.: 92-0393
May 12, 1992
Mr. Don Babinchak
PERSONNEL DIRECTOR
KENNECOTT CORP
1515 MINERAL SQUARE
SALT LAKE, UT 84147
Dear Mr. Babinchak:
Your organization is hereby requested to submit information and
records relevent to the subject charge of discrimination. This agency
is required by law to investigate charges filed with it, and the
enclosed request for information does not necessarily represent the
entire body of evidence which we need to obtain from your organization
in order that a proper determination as to the merits of the charge can
be made. Please submit a response to the requested information by the
deadline cited below.
You may be assured that any information or explanation supplied by
your organization will not be made public.
Sincerely,
^

Jay H. Fowler
Investigator
Response Deadline Date: 052692

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

:hg. Party:
despondent:
:harge No.:

Hausknect, Stephen E
KENNECOTT CORP
92-0393

Give the correct name and address of the facility named in the charge.
State the total number of persons who were employed by your organization
during the relevant period. Include both full and part-time employees.
How many employees are employed by your organization at the present time?
Supply an organizational chart, statement, or documents which describe you
corporate structure, indicating, if any, the relationship between it and
all superior and subordinate establishments within the organization.
Supply a statement or documents which identify the principal product or
service of the named facility.
State the legal status of your organization, i.e, corporation, partnership
tax-exempt non-profit, etc. If incorporated, identify the state of
incorporation.
State whether your organization has a contract with any agency of the
federal government or is a subcontractor on a project which receives
federal funding. Is your organization covered by the provisions of
Executive Order 11246? If your answer is yes, has your organization been
the subject of a compliance review by the OFCCP at any time during the pas
two years?
Submit a written position statement on each of the allegations of the
charge, accompanied by documentary evidence and/or written statements,
where appropriate. Also include any additional information and explanatio
you deem relevant to the charge.
Submit copies of all written rules, policies and procedures relating to th
issue(s) raised in the charge. If such does not exist in written form,
explain the rules, policies and procedures.
ssue: DISCHARGE
If the charging party was discharged, submit the following:
a. date of discharge,
b. reason for discharge,
c. statement of whether the charging party had any right of appeal, and
whether the charging party made use of any appeal rights,
d. person recommending the discharge, including name, position held,
and date of birth,
r
e. person making final decision to discharge the charging party, includinc
name, position held, and date of birth.
Attach copy of any evaluation or investigation report relating to the
discharge, and
f. copies of all pertinent documents in the charging party's personnel

file relating to ^-he subject discharge.
Explain your discharge procedures in effect at the time of the alleged
violation. If the procedures are in writing submit a copy.
Submit copies of all written rules relating to employee duties and conduct.
Explain how employees learn the contents and rules.
List all employees who committed the same or substantially similar
offense(s) that the charging party committed and the disciplinary action
taken against them. Supply backup documentation for the list. Include
name, position title, and date of birth.
List all the employees discharged within the relevant period. For
each employee, include employee's name, position title, reason for
and date of discharge, and date of birth, and a copy of the separation not;
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PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
A Professional Law Corporation

Lee Kapaloski
Keith E Taylor
Stephen J Hull
James B Lee
John
B Wilson
Gordon L Roberts
Robert C Hyde
F Robert Reeder
Craig B Terry
Lawrence E Stevens
David A Anderson
Daniel M Allred
Gary E Doctorman
Roy G Haslam
Kent B Alderman
Dallin W Jensen
John T Anderson
W Jeffery Fillmore
Kent O Roche
KentW Wmterholler
Patricia J Winmill
Barbara K Polich
Randv M Gnmshaw
Randy L Dryer
Lawrence R Barusch
Charles H Thronson
Maxwell A Miller
David R Bird
Raymond J Etcheverry Gary B Hansen
William D Holyoak
Francis M Wikstrom
David W Tundermann Paul D Veasy
Daniel W Hmdert
Chris Wangsgard
Lois A Baar
James M Elegante
Lynn R. Cardey-Yates
Val R Antczak
Carolyn Montgomery
Patrick J Garver
Ronald S. Poelman
Spencer E Austin

O N E UTAH CENTER

201 South Mam Street Suite 1800 . Post Office Box 11898
Salt Lake City Utah 84147-0898
Telephone 801-532-1234 . Facsimile 801-536-6111

June 10, 1992

T Patrick Casey
Valden P Livingston
Michael L Larsen
Jonathan K Butler
David G Mangum
Derek Langton
Lucy B Jenkins
Lorna Rogers Burgess
Thomas R Grisley
David L Deisley
Richard M Marsh
Hal J Pos
W Mark Gavre
Christopher E Bramhall
Mark S Webber
Mark M Bettilyon
James C Hyde
J Michael Bailey
E Russell Vetter
J Thomas Beckett
M Lindsay Ford
Jim Butler
Kenneth R. Barrett

Thomas B Brunker
Douglas R Davis
Elizabeth S Conley
Elizabeth S Whitney
Michael M Smith
Elisabeth R Blattner
James H Woodall
James E Karkut
William J Evans
C Kevin Speirs
Howard C Young
David W Zimmerman
L Ward Wagstaff
Monica Whalen Pace
Alan K Flake
K C Jensen
Lisa A Kirschner
Michael A Zody
Paul E Dame
Elizabeth Kitchens Jones
David M Bennion
Matthew J Harmer
John E Diaz

DECEIVED
JUN 1 0 19%

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
Investigator
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah
Labor/Anti-Discrimination D i v i s i o n
160 East 300 South
Box 510910
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84151-0910
Re:

NDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
^^DISCRIMIN/kJIONDIVIS^*

Stephen E. Hausknecht v s . Kennecott Corporation
UADD Number 92-0393

Dear Mr. Fowler:
This firm represents Kennecott Corporation in connect i o n with the above-referenced charge of age d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f i l e d
by Mr. Hausknecht on May 6, 1992.
Although Mr. Hausknecht has
i n d i c a t e d that age forms the b a s i s of h i s claim of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , h i s charge of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n contains no s p e c i f i c a l l e g a t i o n s which support the claim.
Our i n v e s t i g a t i o n demonstrates
that no l e g a l l y proscribed
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r a t i o n played any part whatsoever in Kennecott 1 s d e c i s i o n to terminate the employment of Mr.
Hausknecht on March 25, 1992.
A d e t a i l e d response i s provided
here for each a l l e g a t i o n which could p o s s i b l y be construed as a
b a s i s for a charge of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , however.
Response to Request for

Information

Kennecott s p e c i f i c a l l y responds to the EEOC Request for
Information which accompanied the Notice of Charge as f o l l o w s :
1.

Give the correct name and address of the f a c i l i t y named in
the charge.

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
June 10, 1992
Page 2
ANSWER:

2.

State the total number of persons who were employed by your
organization during the relevant period.
Include both full
and part-time employees. How many employees are employed by
your organization at the present time?

ANSWER:

3.

At the time of the termination of his employment, Mr.
Hausknecht reported to F.C. Dunford, Manager Office
Services, who in turn reported to F.L. Fisher, Director
Security and Administration, who in turn reported to
D.L. Babinchak, Vice President Human Resources and
Administration.

Supply a statement or documents which identify the principal
product or service of the named facility.

ANSWER:

1

For purposes of this request, Kennecott defines the
"relevant period" as January 1, 1991, through March 31,
1992, and the "organization" as the organizational unit
within Kennecott Corporation known as Security and
Administration in which Mr. Hausknecht was employed.
On January 1, 1991, the structure was such that the
services presently performed by Security and Administration were covered by two separate organizational
units known as Security and Administration and Office
Services.
There were 10 employees.
On January 1,
1992, th£ organizational unit was known as Security and
Administration; there were 12 employees. On March 31,
1992, there were 13 employees.1

Supply an organizational chart, statement, or documents
which describe your corporate structure, indicating, if any,
the relationship between it and all superior and subordinate
establishments within the organization.

ANSWER:

4*

Kennecott Corporation
10 East South Temple
P.O. Box 11248
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147.

Kennecott Corporation is a minerals company engaged in
all facets of mineral exploration, mining, concentrating, and refining.
Security and Administration provides
office
services
for Kennecott
headquarters

Students are employed in intern programs at various times
and for various periods of time at the Technical Center and their
numbers are not included here.

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
June 10, 1992
Page 3
located at 10 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and for the Technical Center located at 1515 Mineral
Square on the University of Utah campus. The Technical
Center houses portions of the Kennecott Exploration
Department, a laboratory used by Kennecott Utah Copper,
and a library reference center. At various times the
building is used for all types of overflow housing
needs
for
various
organizational
units
within
Kennecott.
5.

State the legal status of your organization, i.e. corporation, partnership, tax-exempt non-profit, etc. If incorporated, identify the state of incorporation.

ANSWER:
6.

State whether your organization has a contract with any
agency of the federal government or is a subcontractor on a
project which receives federal funding. Is your organization covered by the provisions of Executive Order 11246? If
your answer is yes, has your organization been the subject
of a compliance review by the OFCCP at any time during the
past two years?

ANSWER:

7.

Kennecott Corporation is a Delaware corporation.

Kennecott Corporation, as a subcontractor, is subject
to Executive Order 11246. Kennecott has not been the
subject of a compliance review by the OFCCP at any time
during the past two years.

Submit a written position statement on each of the allegations of the charge, accompanied by documentary evidence
and/or written statements, where appropriate. Also include
any additional information and explanation you deem relevant
to the charge.

ANSWER:
"PERSONAL HARM; I was terminated."
Kennecott terminated the employment of Mr. Hausknecht
on March 25, 1992.
"RESPONDENT'S REASON; I was accused of sexual harassment."
Kennecott was advised that Mr. Hausknecht may have
engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment.
After a complete and thorough investigation, Kennecott
determined that in fact Mr. Hausknecht had engaged in

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
June 10, 1992
Page 4
conduct which was in violation of Kennecott's sexual
harassment policy.
"DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT; I believe that I have been illegally
discriminated against based upon my age, over 40, in violation of
the Age Discrimination Act of 1963, as amended: and the Utah
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended, in that:
I am over 40."
Kennecott recognizes that 1Mr. Hausknecht is over 40, but his age
had no impact on Kennecott s decision to terminate his employment
as a result of his pervasive and objectionable conduct towards
Kennecott1s female employees.
"Not having any training regarding sexual harassment or what constitutes sexual harassment, and without any previous warnings,
and having 38 years service with the respondent, I was terminated, being told that I was guilty of sexual harassment."
It is unbelievable that a person living in the United States in
the last decade of the 20th century would seek to exculpate himself and excuse reprehensible behavior towards female employees
by claiming that he required specific training regarding sexual
harassment or what constitutes sexual harassment. It is irrelevant whether Mr. Hausknecht received previous warnings regarding
his conduct. His years of service with Kennecott are irrelevant.
What is at issue here is whether Mr. Hausknecht11s employment was
terminated because of his age. Mr. Hausknecht s employment was
terminated because of his egregious
conduct and his unsatisfactory performance.
Mr. Hausknecht1s protests are disingenuous:
Mr. Hausknecht admitted having seen and having read the sexual
harassment policy posted on the bulletin boards at the Technical
Center where he worked. Furthermore, during one incident when
Mr. Hausknecht backed a female employee into a corner in an isolated part of the building in which he worked and requested a
kiss in exchange for obtaining a desk, Mr. Hausknecht stated: "I
guess I can't do this or it would be called sexual harassment."
"I am avare of a male employee, under the age of 40, who was
charged with sexual harassment who has not been terminated and is
still employed by the respondent,"
See answer to Request for Information No. 4 below.
"Therefore, I believe that I have been a victim of disparate
treatment based on my age, which I believe to be a discriminatory
practice,"

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
June 10, 1992
Page 5
Age played no consideration in the decision to terminate Mr.
Hausknecht's employment. As noted below, another male employee
under the age of 40 was also terminated for similar conduct.
8.

Submit copies of all written rules, policies and procedures
relating to the issue(s) raised in the charge. If such does
not exist in written form, explain the rules, policies and
procedures.

ANSWER:
ISSUE:
1.

Kennecott's sexual harassment policy
Exhibit 1.

is attached as

DISCHARGE

If the charging party was discharged, submit the following:
a.

ANSWER:
b.
ANSWER:
c.

ANSWER:
d.
ANSWER:

date of discharge,
a.

March 25, 1992.

reason for discharge,
b.

Pervasive sexual harassment of female employees
and unsatisfactory performance.

statement of whether the charging party had any right
of appeal, and whether the charging party made use of
any appeal rights,
c.

Kennecott has no appeal process relating to termination of employment of non-represented employees.

person recommending the discharge,
position held, and date of birth,
d.

including

name,

E.F. Morrison, Director Employee and Industrial
Relations, November 27, 1934.
F.L. Fisher, Director Security and Administration,
May 10, 1944.
L.V. Eastlick, Director Human Resources, December
1, 1947.

person making final decision to discharge the charging
party, including name, position held, and date of
birth.

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
June 10, 1992
Page 6
ANSWER:
f.
ANSWER:
2.

2

copies of all pertinent documents in the charging party's personnel file relating to the subject discharge.
f.

See Exhibit 2. 2

The
termination
of
employment
of
non-represented
employees is handled on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, there are no written procedures relating to the
discharge of non-represented employees at Kennecott
Corporation. In this case there were charges of improprieties and the charges were investigated both at the
appropriate
management
level
and
within
Human
Resources.

Submit copies of all written rules relating to employee
duties and conduct.
Explain how employees learn the contents and rules.

ANSWER:

4.

D.L. Babinchak, Vice President Human Resources and
Administration, November 8, 1935.

Explain your discharge procedures in effect at the time of
the alleged violation.
If the procedures are in writing
submit a copy.

ANSWER:

3.

e.

Kennecott1s policy on sexual harassment is contained in
Exhibit 1.
In Mr. Hausknecht's work area, the policy
was posted on bulletin boards located at the front
lobby, upstairs near the laboratory, and in the basement.
Mr. Hausknecht has admitted having read and
being familiar with the policy on sexual harassment.

List all employees who committed the same or substantially
similar offense(s) that the charging party committed and the
disciplinary action taken against them. Supply backup documentation for the list.
Include name, position title, and
date of birth.

Kennecott is careful to protect the confidentiality of
present and former employees. Kennecott will cooperate with the
agency to the extent necessary for the agency to conduct its
investigation but believes no useful purpose will be served by
disclosing the names of employees with whom interviews were conducted during the course of Kennecott1s investigation, particularly where this information may be available to the charging
party without the protection of an order of confidentiality
issued by an appropriate federal court.

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
June 10, 1992
Page 7
ANSWER:

In early 1991, Kennecott terminated the employment of
Mr. A.,3 a janitor, born May 26, 1958, for unsatisfactory performance and for having engaged in conduct
described as sexual harassment, including making
advances to other female employees and cornering a
female employee in an isolated area to ask for a kiss.4
There were also elements of his record considered too
harmful to place him in any other position.
In November, 1991, Mr. B 5 , Building Services Technician, born January 8, 1962, engaged in conduct
described as sexual harassment in that he on several
occasions approached one of the female employees whom
he supervised, engaged in banter of a sexual nature
with her, and asked for dates with her. The employee
was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a janitor,
received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so
as to avoid contact with female employees.

5,

List all the employees discharged within the relevant
period. For £ach employee, including employee's name, position title, reason for and date of discharge, and date of
birth, and a copy of the separation notice.

ANSWER:

Other than the charging party and the individuals noted
in the answer to No. 4 above, no persons have been discharged during the relevant period within the organizational unit.
GENERAL STATEMENT

Kennecott believes it is important for the agency to
understand the background of Mr. Hausknecht's employment with
Kennecott and of the termination of his employment.
3

Kennecott will cooperate with the agency in its investigation but believes no useful purpose will be served by disclosing
the name of the referenced employee. See footnote 2 above.
4

Kennecott maintains a file with respect to the referenced
individual, but, as noted above, Kennecott strives to protect the
confidentiality of its present and former employees. Furthermore, it is unclear exactly what "backup documentation11 is sought
by or might be of assistance to the agency, and, therefore, the
file on this individual is not provided here.
See footnotes 3 and 4 above.
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June 10, 1992
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Mr. Hausknecht held the position of Supervisor Maintenance Services within Security and Administration at the time of
his discharge. In 1989, Mr. Hausknecht had been reprimanded for
disposing of Kennecott property without authorization. Again in
June of 1991, Mr. Hausknecht was the subject of an internal
review relating to his work habits.
In particular, management
was concerned that Mr. Hausknecht conducted himself without
proper authority.
In late June 1991, Mr. F.L. Fisher, Director
Security and Administration, attempted to locate Mr. Hausknecht,
was unable to do so, and finally determined that Mr. Hausknecht
had taken vacation without advising that he would do so. At the
same time Mr. Hausknecht had allowed the summer intern from the
University of Utah to leave, thus leaving the building without
security or coverage for services.
On March 18, 1992, Mr. F.C. Dunford received a telephone call from an employee at the Technical Center indicating
that the water to the building had been turned off without
notice, thus significantly inconveniencing the other employees in
the building. Mr. Dunford located Mr. Hausknecht and pointed out
to him that he should have advised the personnel in the building
that the water would be turned off. Angered, Mr. Hausknecht confronted the employee and others in the lunchroom and reproached
them for having called his boss. Mr. Hausknecht then told them
that he would retaliate by taking away the medical supplies, such
as bandaids and headache remedies, which were located in their
work areas. This display of ill temper and petty retribution was
apparently the final straw for the women who had to work with Mr.
Hausknecht.
Mr. F.L. Fisher was notified of the problem.
Mr.
Fisher drove to the Technical Center and discussed the matter
with the employee. At that point the employee raised issues of
sexual harassment.
In essence she pointed out that over an
extended period of time, Mr. Hausknecht had attempted or had
actually hugged and kissed many of the women who worked in the
building. While there were no previous overt threats of retaliation, if the women were not nice to Mr. Hausknecht, they did
notice differences in the level of services provided them.
Mr. Fisher contacted Ms. L.V. Eastlick, Director Human
Resources, and requested her assistance in an immediate investigation of the allegations. Over the course of the following several days, Mr. Fisher and Ms. Eastlick conducted numerous interviews of women who worked at the Technical Center. They determined that Mr. Hausknecht had indeed engaged in a long-standing
and pervasive pattern of activities consistent with sexual
harassment.
Women who worked in the building went to great
lengths to avoid contact with Mr. Hausknecht because of his
demands. They determined that Mr. Hausknecht would occasionally
suggest that he ought to receive a hug or a kiss before giving

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
June 10, 1992
Page 9
out supplies; in some instances female employees would go
together to obtain supplies from Mr. Hausknecht, since they were
uncomfortable
in approaching
him alone.
Furthermore, Mr.
Hausknecht engaged in a pattern of petty retribution with those
women who refused to acquiesce to his demands. For example, Mr.
Hausknecht had responsibility for assigning parking spaces at the
technical center.
In some instances those women who had not
cooperated with Mr. Hausknecht1s request to "be nice" found that
their parking assignments were changed and that they were
assigned to park in distant areas away from the building. In one
instance it was determined that an employee who needed a desk had
made a request to Mr. Hausknecht, whose job it was to procure
such items.
He advised her that he had located a desk and
invited her into an isolated part of the building to view it.
Upon reaching the isolated part of the building, he backed her
into a corner and stated that providing a desk like this for her
deserved a kiss.
It was reported during the investigation that
Hausknecht*s conduct towards Kennecott1s female employees
been observed by ^ennecott's summer interns.

Mr.
had

Detailed minutes of all the interviews are contained in
Exhibit 2 hereto.6
On March 20, 1992, Mr. Hausknecht was invited to Kennecott' s headquarters whereupon he was confronted with the allegations.
He admitted that he was guilty of hugging and kissing
Kennecott's female employees and that in connection with the desk
incident, he had indeed attempted to exact a kiss as payment for
doing his job. He admitted that he had read Kennecott's policy
on sexual harassment. Mr. Hausknecht was suspended pending further investigation and was instructed not to have any further
contact with Kennecott's female employees.
Kennecott conducted further extensive investigation,
engaged in extensive internal review, and attempted to determine
whether Mr. Hausknecht could be effectively employed in another
location. However, there were no jobs requiring his skills which
could be performed in isolation. Kennecott management determined
that Mr. Hausknecht*s conduct was disruptive of the workplace,
that it impinged on employee morale, that it caused resentment,
that it caused inefficiencies in the workplace, that it provided
a poor example, and that it may be viewed as illegal.
Mr.
Hausknecht1s age played no part in Kennecott1s decision.
Given
See footnote 2 above.
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his long-standing propensity to exact special favors from female
employees particularly when viewed in light of identified performance problems, Kennecott felt that it had no choice but to terminate his employment.
On Wednesday, March 25, 1992, Kennecott
informed Mr. Hausknecht that his employment with the company was
terminated.
No one has been hired to replace Mr. Hausknecht and
Kennecott has no intention of replacing him. The duties which he
previously performed are performed in some respects by Mr. F.C.
Dunford7
and
in
other
respects
by
outside
independent
contractors.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the information set forth here that
Mr. Hausknecht's charge of age discrimination
is entirely
unfounded. We believe the Division should enter a finding of no
probable cause.
If we can provide the Division with further
information regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,

James M. ETegante

Mr. Dunford's date of birth is March 4, 1937.

EXHIBIT 1

KENNECOTT

HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY MANUAL

SUBJECT:

TITLE:
HUMAN MSOURCES

SEXUAL HARA8SMZKT

STATIST QFPQUCY
A.

It is the policy of Kennecott to prevent discrimbation based on sex, including sexual harassment of its employees.
Unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors and oiktr verbal or physical cooduct #f a sexual nature shall
be deemed to constitute sexual harassment when:
1.

Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly* term or condition of an indi-viduaTs
employment.

2.

Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment dedcions
affecting such individual.

3.

Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. For example, unwanted physical contact, foul language,
sexual!) oriented propositions, jokes or remarks, obscene gestures or the display of sexually explicit pictures,
cartoons or other materials may be considered offensive to another employee and, thus, should not occur.
4

B.

Sexual harassment, as outlined in the preceding Paragraph A, will not be tolerated and may be cause for st\t:c
disciplinary action, including discharge.

C.

Officials, managers and supervisors are charged with the responsibility of eliminating any conditions which would
prevent the maintenance of u or king conditions that are free from sexual harassment.

D.

Any employee who feels that he or she has been sexually harassed should immediately report the matter to bis
or her supervisor. If that person is unavailable or the employee believes that it would be inappropriate to contact
his or her supervisor, the employee should immediately contact the £ £ 0 Coordinator who is:
at

Name

Phone Number

Any supervisor or manager who becomes aware of any possible sexual harassment should immediately advise the
£ £ 0 Coordinator who will handle such matters in a lawful maimer to ensure that such conduct does not continue.
All complaints of sexual harassment will be investigated in as discreet and confidential a fashion as possible. No
person will be adversely affected in employment wiih the Company as a result of bringing complaints of sexual
harassment.
E.

This policy statement is to be posted on all Kennecott bulletin boards.

Approved by:

' /j(>"\oWU^

0«t«: January 1, 1991
S»f»fM««t: Jan. 1, 1990
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K U box n z 4 *
Sa:t La^6 City UT S-147
(801; 322-8344
Russell C. Babcock. Jr.

Kennecott

October 20, 1989

TO:

S. E. Hausknecht

SUBJECT:

Unauthorized Transfer of Kennecott Office
Furniture to the University of Utah

We have discussed this subject twice this week and I am writing
this memo to document our conclusions.
We agree that the transfer of Kennecott property without preparing
a property disposal approval form and gaining authorization is
inappropriate and will not happen again. Unauthorized disposals
could be considered theft and must be avoided. The consequences
could lead to disciplinary action and/or dismissal.
When you have surplus property in the future you will complete a
PDA form listing the surplus items and recommending their
disposition. You will give the completed form to Dan O1Brian who
will review it and obtain the necessary approvals if he concurs
with your recommendation. You will not dispose of surplus property
until you have received a copy of the approved PDA form.
If this memo accurately states our agreement, please confirm by
signing below.

R. C. Babcock

S. E. Hausknecht
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3. E. Hauaknacht

Summary

March 24, 1992

Frank Fitter received complaint froa female employee on March is, 1992:
Hauaknacht confrontad hor becausa aha had raportad a vatar outage to Fred
Dunford (aha had baan unabla to locata Hauaknacht to talk to him about it).
Hauaknacht waa vary angry with har for calling Fred. "Didn't appreciate Pred
baing called, than Frad getting on him and tailing him hov to do hie job."
Ha threatened retaliation, "If you complain about ma I'll take away the first
aid kit and I'll make a complaint about tha files blocking the door to the
equipment room." Ha did taka itema on top of tha first aid kit and then
left.
During tha discussion with Fisher, the female employee said, "And there is
another problem."!
Whenever thay naad to obtain any euppllaa or in order to get building
services work dona, Hauaknacht aaya, "Give ma a little hug," and then he will
put hia arm around tha woman9a shoulder and bug her. Thia has been going on
for a long time and a number of othar woman hava experienced the same thing.
Woman employees are afraid to go over to hia area of the building alone.
Further discueeio&e with eight women hava revealed the following;
There waa a broad range of feelings about Hauaknacht expressed by the women
interviewed. Some of'the women said "Oh, that's juat Steve," or "He's just
friendly." Others will not go to hia area alone, they "Find it distasteful"
and will ask other men to get things for them or to get things done rather
than go to Steve directly.
Original complainant waa working alone during Christmas, 1991 and went down
to Hauaknacht'a areaf<i#t*^ He put hia arm around her and leaned down "as if
to kiaa her." She pushed him away and walked out. He didn't push it any
further. Said it ia common occurrence for him to walk up and put his arm
around her ehouldar or waist.
Incident in January, 1992 - Steve offered to get one woman a larger desk.
Took her over to vacant aide of the building to ahow her the desk. Pushed up
aaainat herf put hia arm around her and said, "A favor like this deserves a
kiaa, but I gueae I can't fdo thia or it would be called aexual harassment."
The woman aaid, "Yea,
that e right, taka your arm off." She did some "fancy
footwork and left.19 She haa not yet received the deak.
One incident reported aecond-hand, J00B0 the woman haa since terminated:
Steve tried to hug her; she "hauled off and slugged him."
Six of the eight women interviewed have been touched physically. One of the
aix only had one encounter - he put hia arm around her and gave her a kiss to
thank her for eome cookiea aha had brought in. Five of the six have been
approached with comments much aa "Give ua a hug," "Give me a little kiss."
One woman waa unaware of any problem (aha haa not worked there since early
1980'a). One haa only heard about the encountera. Situation may have been

going on a long time. According to original complainant, since 1981.
Appears women that are "nice* to Steve (those that stop and talk, stroke his
ego, or oubmit to hugs, etc.) get the service they need. Those that are
unresponsive or those who complain about service, may not get service or may
be the recipients of "petty" retaliation: Lights might not get changed;
boxes may not be moved; furniture may not be moved; mail is late or doesn't
go out; parking stall is suddenly changed to the top of the hill. Nothing is
usually said, "just little things happen or don't happen." It was reported
that petty retaliation does not happen to the men at the Tech Center,
Hausknechtfs behavior is reported by those who have had a personal encounter
as "harmless, but annoying" or "an annoyance," or "not proper behavior."
Advances are described as "unwelcome.• None felt "intimidated" nor were they
"afraid of physical harm." However, some reported they were afraid he would
get even with them through patty retaliation, that he "carries a grudge," or
that he is like a little kid, "stamping his feet."
None of the women has ever discussed this with any supervisor at the Tech
Center.
Original complainant said she never felt it was a reportable
incident, "Just something we live with for working up there." Females h^ve
talked about him among themselves.
Appears he may feel he has more control at Tech Center than he actually does.
Many women made reference to him running "his little fiefdom," or his "own
little domain," or "that's his building."
employee has a history of questionable performance:
Not responding to requests for service promptly or ignoring them completely.
Disposing of furniture, equipment, and files without proper authorization.
Committing company funds for purchases and repairs to building without proper
financial authorization. Inadequate control over students: allowing them to
come and go as they please; allowing them to set own hours; failure to
supervise their activities appropriately. Frequent "disappearances" from
building or work area. Pailura to advise supervisor, or anyono else, that he
would ba on vacation.
lauskneebt vae interviewed on Friday, March 20, 1992i
He was confronted with summary of complaints and admitted to the above
reported female allegations. Also acknowledged that he had read the Sexual
Harassment policy; He was told in no uncertain terms that his behavior is
unacceptable and was suspended pending outcome of
investigation.
Investigation,reveals a repeated pattern cf touching female employees as well
am a series of performance problems which appear to get better for a time,
but art repeated unless he is continually watched.
Jtecommend termination effmotive Maroh 25, 1992; continue pay and benefits
through Maroh 31, 1992.

L. V. Eastlick

F. L. Fisher
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COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
A Professional Corporation

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

525 EAST FIRST SOUTH
FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102

BRUCE G. COHNE
RICHARD A. RAPPAPORT
ROGER G. SEGAL
JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
VERNON L. HOPKINSON
JOHN T. MORGAN
KEITH W. MEADE
RAY M. BECK
PAULJ.TOSCANO
CLIFFORD C. ROSS
JULIE A. BRYAN
ERIK STRINDBERG
DANIEL J. TORKELSON
MARTHA S. STONEBROOK
LESLIE VAN FRANK

MaiUn

* Address
POST OFFICE BOX 11008
84147-0008
QO 0 _ _
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Telecopier (801) 355-1813

nFrnrnsTQET
JOHN M A I O N
J0HN

MAS0N

July 22, 1992

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
Investigator
Industrial Commission of Utah
Labor/Anti-Di s c ri mi nati on Di vi s i on
160 East 300 South
Box 510910
Salt Lake City, Utah
84151-0910
Re:

Stephen E. Hausknecht v. Kennecott Corporation
UADD Number 92-0393

Dear Mr. Fowler:
I apologize for the delay in submitting Mr. Hausknecht7 s
reply letter in support of his age discrimination claim.
In an
effort to save time, I have gone through, and for the most part,
directed my comments solely to the specific points raised in
Kennecott' s letter of June 10, 1992.
The page numbers and
paragraph numbers refer to the pages and numbers utilized in
Kennecott' s response letter.
One or two general comments are in order. Kennecott is
contending that Mr. Hausknecht was terminated for engaging in
conduct
which
may
constitute
sexual
harassment
and
for
unsatisfactory work performance.
This dual assertion leaves
Kennecott' s entire answer suspect. Less than one month before he
was terminated, March 1, 1992 to be exact, Mr. Hausknecht received
a satisfactory job performance review and a $2,300.00 per year
raise. At that time, less than one month before he was fired, no
mention was made of any unsatisfactory areas of performance or that
he had engaged in any unprofessional behavior or activities. To
now contend that he was discharged for poor job performance and
sexual harassment in light of this, is at best disingenuous. More
likely it reflects the fact that Kennecott used the proffered
reasons to terminate Mr. Hausknecht so they could reduce their
staff without having to pay proper severance benefits.

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
July 22, 1992
-2-

Comments regarding
Kennecott's letter follow:

the

specific

issues

raised

in

Page 2 - Paragraph 2:
Kennecott indicates in their answer to
paragraph 2 that there were between 10 and 13 employees in the
organizational unit where Mr. Hausknecht was employed. We do not
dispute these figures, except insofar as they are evidently raised
in an effort to argue that Kennecott should not be covered under
the state or federal anti-discrimination laws.
Obviously, this
argument has no merit as Kennecott Corporation has far in excess of
the jurisdictional numbers required under botn the state and
federal acts.
Page 3-4 - Paragraph 7: Kennecott states that it is "unbelievable
that a person living in the United States in the last decade of the
20th Century [would not understand what constitutes sexual
harassment]." This is an obvious attempt to shore up the total
inadequacies of Kennecott' s training programs, or perhaps I should
say lack of training programs.
At no time did Mr. Hausknecht
receive any training regarding what constitutes sexual harassment.
Mr. Hausknecht did not know that placing his hand on a female
employee' s shoulder on a few occasions, could constitute sexual
harassment, let alone that it would be the basis for termination.
Further, at no time was any complaint ever made against Mr.
Hausknecht, or did he receive any warnings prior to the time he was
called in and terminated.
What constitutes the boundaries of
sexual harassment is not, as Kennecott asserts, clear cut and to a
large extent reflects changing morays and values of our society.
It is patently unreasonable for a company to not provide any sort
of training regarding sexual harassment and then to claim that an
employee should know or must know what constitutes harassment.
In regards to the allegations that Mr. Hausknecht backed
a female employee into a corner, this is untrue. Mr. Hausknecht
was asked by one of the female employees to make a frame for her
computer screen. He did so, at which time she asked if they could
go down and look at some of the desks on the first floor. They did
so, and during that time Mr. Hausknecht did say to her, in a joking
manner, "this ought to deserve a kiss, but it might constitute or
be considered sexual harassment. " Whether such a statement in
itself constitutes sexual harassment is subject to debate. In any
event, Mr. Hausknecht certainly did not understand that this
statement itself might constitute sexual harassment. At no time
was there any physical threats or physical overtures.
There must also be reiterated that at no time did Mr.
Hausknecht ever receive any warning or even any complaints from any
of the female employees. He admits that on a few occasions he did

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
July 22, 1992
-3put his hand or arm on a woman' s shoulder. For example, he recalls
at a Christmas party he placed his arm on Claudia's shoulder. Her
response was to laugh and say something to the effect of "Oh, now".
Again, it is simply not fair to not provide an employee with any
training or even any warning that their behavior might be
unacceptable, and then to terminate him.
Page 6 - Paragraph 4:
Kennecott dismisses the fact that it has
treated younger employees who have been accused of sexual
harassment in a disparate manner. It is admitted on page seven of
Kennecott' s reply that E.ldon Jensen did engage in conduct which
might be described as sexual harassment.
However, he was not
terminated but reassigned. Ironically, Mr. Jensen was the roommate
of Don Babinchat' s son. Mr. Babinchat was, we believe, involved in
the decision to terminate Mr. Hausknecht.

GENERAL STATEMENT
Page 8 - Paragraph 1:,
To reiterate, Kennecott' s contention that
Mr.
Hausknecht' s
work performance was
unsatisfactory is
disingenuous at best. On March 1, 1992, he received a favorable
job review and a $2,300.00 raise. To attempt to counteract this
fact by referring to the disposal of Kennecott property in 1989, is
absurd. Ironically enough, the incident in 1989, which did not
lead to a formal reprimand, involved Mr. Hausknecht giving away one
desk to the Human Resources Department of the University of Utah.
This was taken from excess inventory contained in the building,
which he had been assigned to dispose of. Ironically, at the time
the incident arose Mr. Hausknecht did give his notes on the matter
to Fred Dunford who apparently never reviewed them and never said
anything further to Mr. Hausknecht about it. In regard to the
allegations regarding unauthorized vacations, these are raised for
the first time in the reply letter and it is impossible to respond
to them. As far as Mr. Hausknecht was concerned, he always advised
Mr. Dunford when he was leaving or planning on taking vacation.
Lastly, you should be aware that Mr. Hausknecht was allowed by Fred
Dunford to work flex hours so that he could take time off to
exercise his back, which had been injured a number of years earlier
in an industrial accident.
Kennecott also refers to the March 18, 1992 water
incident and tries to connect it with some action on the part of
Mr. Hausknecht. What occurred with the water and medical supplies
is unrelated. March 18, 1992 Mr. Hausknecht did have to turn off
the water to parts of the building for approximately 7-10 minutes
when certain shut-off valves did not work. Later that day, several
of the women employees, Claudia, Tracy Workman, Sue Sekoltky did
have a brief conversation with Mr. Hausknecht at which time he told
them he was sorry if he caused them any inconvenience and then
asked them why they had called Fred Dunford. Their reply to him
was, HWe just wanted to know how long we would be without water. "

Mr, Jay H. Fowler
July 22, 1992
-4-

At that time, Mr. Hausknecht did take away certain extra medical
supplies which had been stock piled. However, the employees were
left with adequate supplies, only excess supplies were removed.
Further, Mr. Hausknecht had gotten approval from Mr. Dunford to
remove the excess supplies at least three days earlier.
There is also a reference at the top of page 9 to an
incident" involving a desk.
Kennecott provides an inaccurate
accounting of what occurred. A woman by the name of Candy Mishnir
(I apologize for the misspelling of her name) did ask Mr.
Hausknecht to locate a desk for her. However, the desk that she
wanted didn' t have any drawers and Mr. Hausknecht was unable to
rebuild it for her use.
He told her this and she never said
anything more about the matter. Again, no physical threats or
coercion occurred.
11

There is also some references on the top of page 9 to
parking lot assignments. Again, Kennecott is attempting to find a
correlation between events when there is none. Mr. Hausknecht was
responsible for assigning spots in the parking lot. On occasion he
would have to move people as the grade and rank of employees at the
building changed. He also had to see that stalls were assigned to
the University of Utah, KUED and the Geological Department, as well
as setting aside spaces for visitors and other staff. At no time
were spaces assigned or taken away, either as favors or in
retribution.
It was also alleged in page 9 that Mr. Hausknecht was
guilty of "hugging and kissing Kennecott employees". As I stated
above Mr. Hausknecht has admitted that on a few occasions he did
place his arm on the shoulder of a female employee. However, at no
time was he ever told that this was improper nor did any of the
women employees ever tell him to stop. As I am sure you are aware,
for behavior to constitute sexual harassment it must be unwanted.
Without training, warnings, or even complaints, there is no way for
Mr. Hausknecht to have any idea that his behavior was unwanted.
Until he was terminated Mr. Hausknecht did not in any way
understand that his behavior could even be construed as
constituting sexual harassment.
It should be pointed out that at the time of termination
that Mr. Hausknecht was responsible for maintaining the entire
Kennecott building at the University. He did this with a staff of
only three part-time students.
He took care of the grounds,
heating, air conditioning, and virtually all other facilities in
the 55,000 square foot building.
The fact that he was able to
accomplish this with such a limited staff was remarkable inasmuch
as at one time he had four full-time custodians plus twelve
additional individuals who reported to him.
Undoubtedly his
ability to keep this building operational is the reason that he

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
July 22, 1992
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received a favorable job review in the beginning of March of this
year.
The reasons proffered for Mr. Hausknecht' s termination
are at best suspect. At no time was Mr. Hausknecht even warned
that his behavior was unacceptable. Further, at no time did he
receive any training regarding sexual harassment or what might
constitute sexual harassment.
Rather, he was led to believe as
late as March 1, 1992, that his performance was more than adequate
and worthy of a raise. To now claim otherwise is unavailing. It
appears that the real reason behind his termination was Kennecott' s
desire to reduce staff without having to pay the appropriate
severance benefits an older, long-time employee such as Mr.
Hausknecht would have received under the terms of Kennecott' s own
policies and procedures.
DATED-this

ES: cb
cc:

Steve Hausknecht

F:\cb\fow. Itr

2 ^ d a v of July, 1992.
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PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Lee Kapaloski
Keith £. Taylor
Stephen J. Hull
James B. Lee
John B. Wilson
Gordon L. Roberts
Robert C. Hyde
F Robert Reeder
Craig B. Terry
Lawrence E. Stevens
David A. Anderson
Daniel M. Allred
Gary E. Doctonnan
Roy G Haslam
Kent B. Alderman
Dailin W. Jensen
John T. Anderson
W. Jeffery Fillmore
Kent O. Roche
Kent W. Winterholler
Patricia J. Winmill
Barbara K. Polich
Randy M. Gnmshaw
Randy L. Dryer
Lawrence R Barusch
Charles H. Thronson
Maxwell A. Miller
David R Bird
Raymond J. Etcheverry Gary B. Hansen
William D. Holyoak
Francis M. Wikstrom
David W. Tundermann Paul D. Veasy
Daniel W. Hmdert
Chris Wangsgard
Lois A. Baar
James M. Elegance
Lynn R. Cardey-Yates
Val R. Antczak
Carolyn Montgomery
Patrick J. Garver
Ronald S. Poelman
Spencer E. Austin
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201 South Main Street. Suite 1800 • Post Office Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone 801-532-1234 . Facsimile 801-536-6111
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION

T Patrick Casey
Valden P. Livingston
Michael L. Larsen
Jonathan K. Butler
David G. Mangum
Derek Langton
Lucy B. Jenkins
Lorna Rogers Burgess
Thomas R. Grisley
David L. Deisley
Richard M. Marsh
Hal J. Pos
W Mark Gavre
Christopher E. Brarahail
Mark S. Webber
Mark M. Bettilyon
James C. Hyde
J. Michael Bailey
E. Russell Vetter
J. Thomas Beckett
M Lindsay Ford
Jim Butler
Kenneth R. Barrett

Thomas B Brunker
Douglas R. Davis
Elizabeth S. Conley
Elizabeth S. Whitney
Michael M. Smith
Elisabeth R. Blatmer
James H. Woodall
James E. Karkut
William J. Evans
C. Kevin Speirs
Howard C. Young
David W. Zimmerman
L. Ward Wagstaff
Montca Whalen Pace
Alan K. Flake
K.C. Jensen
Lisa A. Kirschner
Michael A. Zody
Paul E. Dame
Elizabeth Kitchens Jones
David M. Bennion
Matthew J. Harmer
John E. Diaz

August 20, 1992

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
Investigator
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah
L a b o r / A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t ion Di v
160 East 300 South
Box 510910
S a l t Lake C i t y ,
Re:

Stephen E. Hausknecht
UADD Number 92-0393

Kennecott Corporation

Dear Mr. Fowler:
We respond here to your l e t t e r
i n v i t i n g a r e b u t t a l to the charging party 1
July 22, 1992.

August 1 1, 1992,
— ^v statement of

Iir. Hausknecht f s r e p l y statement amounts t o nothing
more than a p o l o g e t i c s for h i s inappropriate behavior with female
employees.
In e s s e n c e he complains that Kennecott management
e r r e d in t e r m i n a t i n g h i s employment.
He s u g g e s t s t h a t Kennecott
had an agenda t o reduce i t s s t a f f by e l i m i n a t i n g workers such as
Mr. Hausknecht.
However, he p r o v i d e s the D i v i s i o n with no
e v i d 1e n c e t o support h i s claim that age was a f a c t o r in Kennec o t t s d e c i s i o n t o terminate h i s employment. The Age D i s c r i m i n a t i o n in Employment Act and the Utah A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Act do
not p r o t e c t American workers from e r r o r s in management's judgment
in t e r m i n a t i n g the employment of workers u n l e s s t h o s e e r r o r s are
bottomed on impermissible m o t i v e s .
Mr. Hausknecht's complaint
t h a t i t i s not fai r to terminate an employee for behavior without
p r o v i d i n g t r a i n i n g or warning must be made in a forum o t h e r than
the Utah A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n D i v i s i o n .

Mr, Jay H. Fowler
August 20, 1992
Page 2
Mr. Hausknecht's own behavior resulted in the termination of his employment.
The assertion that Mr. Hausknecht1 s
behavior could constitute sexual harassment only if it is
unwanted is, of course, not 1 consistent with either the law or the
plain language of Kennecott s sexual harassment policy,
Exhibit 1
to Kennecott's response.
Despite Mr. Hausknecht1s further
assertion that his behavior is excusable on the basis that
Kennecott did not provide a bright-line test as to what constitutes sexual harassment in the workplace, the exhibits submitted
to the Division as part of Kennecott1s response to the charge are
replete with the comments of female employees for whom Mr.
Hausknecht created an environment which was less than desirable.
In his reply, Mr1". Hausknecht refers to a younger
individual whom he claims was treated differently for similar
behavior,^
However, in response to the Division's request,
Kennecott cited, at page 7 of its Response, two individuals who
were disciplined for behavior similar to that of Mr. Hausknecht.
Conveniently, Mr. Hausknecht does not refer to that much younger
33-year-old employee whose employment was terminated for similar
behavior.
It is evident from the information provided by
Kennecott in its response that age plays no part in Kennecottfs
decision to retain an employee or to terminate employment where,
in management's judgment, the behavior and the circumstances
warrant it.
Mr. Hausknecht seems
suggest that Kennecott has
failed to reveal the fact that Mr. D.L. Babinchak2 was involved
in the termination of Mr. Hausknecht. However, in response to
the Division's specific request to disclose the person making the
final decision to discharge Mr. Hausknecht, Kennecott forthrightly identified Mr. Babinchak.
Mr. Hausknecht fails completely to provide any evidence that Mr. Babinchak's decision was
motivated by age.
-The remainder of Mi: , Hausknecht' s rebu11a 1 provides
nothing more than his convenient version of the facts.
Mr.
Hausknecht's more forthright statements made at the time of the
investigation were considered by Kennecott in its evaluation of
the situation.
Kennecott was not persuaded that, given his
1

It is unfortunate that Mr. Hausknecht has not cared enough
to follow Kennecott's lead in respecting the confidentiality of
employees and has referred by name to a particular individual as
an example of a younger person treated differentiv than he.
2
in his letter, the charging party ai i -_
Babinchak as "Mr. Babinchat."

refers to Mr.

Mr. Jay H. Fowler
August 20, 1992
Page 3
overall performance history and the egregious nature of I lis
conduct with female employees, Mr. Hausknecht's employment should
be continued.
A mere dispute as to the events generally is
irrelevant to the issue of whether Kennecott terminated Mr.
Hausknecht's employment because of his age.
Mr. Hausknecht's
version of the facts does not demonstrate any age bias on the
part of Kennecott,
Given the state of the record, the Division should find
insufficient evidence to support a charge of age discrimination.
Sincerely,

James M. E l e g a n t e
JME/sh
JME/081792F
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State ot utan

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LABOR / ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION

Stephen M Hadley
Chairman

Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

John A. Medina
Director

Mailing Address:
Industrial Commission of Utah
Labor Division
Salt Lake Cry, Utah 84114-6630
FAX #: (801) 530-7609

Street Address:
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Th.rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 530-6801

STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECHT
COMPLAINANT,

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Dixie L. Minson
Commissioner

*

92-039:
VS.

KENNECOTT CORP,, a Delaware
Corporation, licensed to do
business in the State of Utah
RESPONDENT,
* * * * *

*

* * *

D E T E R M I N A T I O N
JURISDICTION
Under the authority vested in me by the U'tah Anti-Discrimination
Act, of 1965, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, as amended, I issue on behalf of this Division, the
following Determination as to the merits of the subject charge.
The jurisdictional requirements have been met as required by the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, the Utah
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended.
SUMMARY OF CHARGE
On May 6, 1992, Stephen E. Hausknecht, hereinafter Charging Party,
alleged that Kennecott Corp., hereinafter Respondent, discriminated
against him based upon his age.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE
The Respondent categorically denies that Charging
subjected to discrimination as a result of his age.

Party

was

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION
A.

Charging Party's Allegations

Charging Party asserts that he has been
against based upon his age, over 40.

i II 1 i'!«i).ii 1 1 \

discriminated

Charging Party asserts that not having any training regarding
sexual harassment or what constitutes sexual harassment, and
without any previous warnings, and having 38 years service with the
Respondent, he was terminated because he was told he was guilty of
sexual harassment.
Charging Party asserts that he is aware of a male employee, under
the age of 40, who was charged with sexual harassment, who has not
been terminated, and is still employed by the Respondent.
Charging Party asserts that less than one month before Charging
Party was terminated, he received a satisfactory job performance
review and a $2,300.00 raise.
Charging Party asserts that he never received any training from
Respondent regarding what constitutes sexual harassment. Charging
Party further asserts that at no time was any complaint ever made
against him, nor did he receive any warnings prior to the time he
was called in and terminated. Charging Party asserts that at no
time was there any physical threats or physical overtures.
Charging Party asserts that the boundaries of sexual harassment is
not clear cut, and to a large extent reflects changing morays and
values of our society.
Charging Party asserts that in regard to the allegation that he
improperly disposed of Respondent's property, Charging Party never
received a formal reprimand, and he was assigned to dispose of such
property.
Charging Party asserts that in regard to the alleged
unauthorized vacations, such were raised for the first time in
Respondent's reply letter. Charging Party further asserts that he
always advised Respondent when he was leaving or planning on taking
vacation.
Charging Party asserts that he apologized to his fellow employees
regarding the water incident. Charging Party further asserts that
he did take away certain extra medical supplies which had been
stock piled. However, it is asserted that the employees were left
with adequate supplies, and Charging Party had gotten approval from
Mr. Dunford to remove such excess at least three days earlier.
Charging Party admits that he went with a female employee to look
at a desk, and told her in a joking manner, "this ought to deserve
a kiss, but it might constitute or be considered sexual
harassment." Charging Party admits that on a few occasions he did
place his arm on the shoulder of a female employee. However,
Charging Party asserts that he was never told that this was
improper no did any of the female employees ever tell him to stop.
Charging Party asserts that in order to constitute sexual
harassment, such behavior must be unwanted, but without any
training warnings or complaints, there is no way of knowing if
Charging Party's behavior was unwanted.

B.

Respondent's Answer to Charging Party's Allegations:

Respondent contends that Charging Party's age had no impact on
Respondent's decision to terminate his employment as a result of
his pervasive and objectionable conduct towards Respondent's female
employees, and his unsatisfactory performance.
Respondent contends that it was advised that Charging Party may
have engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment. Respondent
further contends that after it conducted a complete and through
investigation, Respondent determined that in fact Charging Party
had engaged in conduct which was in violation of Respondent's
sexual harassment policy.
Such harassment, it is contended,
included: (1) When Charging Party went with a female employee to
look at a desk in an isolated part of the building in which they
worked, Charging Party backed her into a corner and requested a
kiss in exchange for a desk. Charging Party stated "I guess I
can't do this or it would be called sexual harassment."; (2)
Charging Party treating female employees differently regarding
assistance, supplies and parking, depending on whether or not they
had been nice to the Charging Party; (3) Some females co-workers
stated that Charging Party had actually hugged or kissed or
attempted to hug and kiss female employees in the building they
worked at; (4) Charging Party would occasionally suggest that he
ought to receive a hug or a kiss before giving out supplies, and in
some instances fepale employees would go together to obtain
supplies from Charging Party, since they were uncomfortable in
approaching him alone.
Respondent contends that Charging Party was not subject to
disparate treatment. Respondent points out that in early 1991,
Respondent terminated the employment of a janitor, who was under
the age of 40, for unsatisfactory performance and for having
engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment, including making
advances to other female employees, and cornering a female employee
in isolated area to ask for a kiss. Furthermore, it is asserted
that there were also elements in such employee's record considered
too harmful to place him in any other position.
Respondent also points out that in November of 1991, a Building
Services Technician, under the age of 40, engaged in conduct
described as sexual harassment, in that he on several occasions
approached one of the female employees whom he supervised, engaged
in banter of a sexual nature with her, and asked for dates with
her. Such employee was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a
janitor, received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so as
to avoid contact with female employees.
Respondent contends that Charging Party's lack of specific training
regarding sexual harassment, lack of prior warnings or complaints,
and his years of service with Respondent are irrelevant to the
issue of whether or not he was terminated because of his age.
Respondent contends that Charging Party admitted having seen and
read Respondent's sexual harassment policy posted on the bulletin

boards at the Technical Center where he worked. Respondent further
points out that during one incident when Charging Party backed a
female employee into a corner in an isolated part of the building
in which he worked and requested a kiss in exchange for obtaining
a desk, Charging Party stated "I guess I can't do this or it would
be called sexual harassment."
Respondent contends that Charging Party held the position of
Supervisor Maintenance Services within Security and Administration
at the time of his discharge. Respondent contends that in 1989,
Charging Party had been reprimanded for disposing of Respondent's
property without authorization. Respondent contends that in June
of 1991, Charging Party was the subject of an internal review
relating to his work habits, particularly, Charging Party taking a
vacation without advising Respondent that he would do so.
Respondent further asserts, that at the same time, Charging Party
allowed a summer intern to leave, thus leaving the building without
security or coverage for services.
It is contended that on March 18, 1992, Respondent received a
telephone call from an employee at the Technical Center indicating
that the water to the building had been turned off without notice,
thus significantly inconveniencing the other employees in the
building. Respondent located Charging Party and pointed out to him
that he should have advised the personnel in the building that the
water would be turned off. It is further contended that Charging
Party became angered and confronted the employee that had called,
among others, and told them that he would retaliate by taking away
the medical supplies, such as band-aids and headache remedies which
were located in their work areas. Respondent asserts that at that
point, the employee who had called to report the lack of water,
reported to Respondent allegations of sexual harassment.
On March 20, 1992, Charging Party was invited to Respondent's
headquarters whereupon he was confronted with the allegations,
wherein Charging Party admitted that he was guilty of hugging and
kissing Respondent's female employees, and that in connection with
the desk incident, he had indeed attempted to exact a kiss as
payment for doing his job. At that interview, it is contended that
Charging Party admitted that he had read Respondent's policy on
sexual harassment. Respondent asserts that it thereafter suspended
Charging Party pending further investigation and was instructed not
to have any further contact with Kennecott's female employees.
Respondent
contends that
it
conducted
further extensive
investigation, engaged in extensive internal review, and attempted
to determine whether Charging Party could be effectively employed
in another location. Respondent contends that there were no jobs
requiring Charging Party's skills which could be performed in
isolation. Therefore, Respondent's contends that its management
determined that Charging Party's conduct was disruptive of the
work-place, that it impinged on employee morale, that it caused
resentment, that it cause inefficiencies in the work-place, that it

provided a poor example, and that it may be viewed as illegal.
Respondent asserts that no one has been hired to replace Charging
Party and Respondent has no intention of replacing him.
ANALYSIS
Charging Party has brought this action against Respondent alleging
violation Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, of 1965, as amended, and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.
A.

Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination

In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
Charging Party must allege and prove the following elements: 1)
that he is a member of a protected class; 2) that he was qualified
for and was performing her job adequately; 3) that he was subjected
to an adverse employment decision based upon his age.
Charging Party is a member of a protected class because he is over
forty years old. Charging Party was qualified and was performing
her job adequately with some exceptions. The record indicates that
a male employee under the age of forty, who was involved in a
similar type of work as Charging Party, was terminated for engaging
in similar kinds of sexual harassment as the Charging Party had
engaged in. The record also indicates that Charging Party was
aware of and understood the Respondent's sexual harassment policy,
has admitted putting his arm around female employees, and in at
least one instance, admitted asking a female employee for a kiss.
Therefore, Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination.
B.

Comparison

Respondent points out that an employee under the age of forty, in
a similar position as Charging Party, was terminated as a result of
similar allegations of sexual harassment.
C.

Respondent's Burden

Although Respondent's burden to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct is relieved by Charging
Party's failure to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination, Respondent's arguments are set out for
completeness.
Respondent contends that Charging Party was terminated as a result
of his violation of Respondent's sexual harassment policies.
Respondent contends that Charging Party has admitted to reading
Respondent's sexual harassment policies.
Respondent further
contends from Charging Party's statement to a female employee after
he requested a kiss from her that MI guess I can't do this or it
would be called sexual harassment,11 implies that Charging Party was
aware of what constitutes sexual harassment. Furthermore, it is
contended that Charging Party had attempted to or did hug and/or

kiss female co-workers. Respondent asserts that Charging Party's
female co-workers were uncomfortable with being alone with the
Charging Party. Respondent further contends that Charging Party
treated his female co-workers differently regarding supplies and
service, based upon whether or not they were nice to him.
Respondent points out that in early 1991, Respondent terminated the
employment of a janitor, who was under the age of 40, for
unsatisfactory performance and for having engaged in conduct
described as sexual harassment, including making advance to other
female employees, and cornering a female employee in isolated an
area to ask for a kiss. Furthermore, it is asserted that there
were also elements in such employee's record considered too harmful
to place him in any other position.
Respondent also points out that in November of 1991, a Building
Services Technician, under the age of 40, engaged in conduct
described as sexual harassment in that he on several occasions
approached one of the female employees whom he supervised, engaged
in banter of a sexual nature with her, and asked for dates with
her. Such employee was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a
janitor, received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so as
to avoid contact with female employees.
Respondent asserts that Charging Party's performance was
unsatisfactory as a result of the following: (1) Charging Party
disposing of Respondent's property without authorization; (2)
Charging Party taking a vacation without notifying Respondent; (3)
Charging Party allowing a co-employee to leave without maintaining
sufficient support and coverage; (4) Charging Party turning off a
building's water without first notifying co-workers; and (5)
Charging Party engaging in sexual harassment of female co-workers.
Therefore,
Respondent
has
articulated
a
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
D*

Summary

Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination. Therefore, the facts in the record, viewed in
their entirety, indicate that there is NO REASONABLE CAUSE to
believe that Charging Party was subjected to discriminatory
practices as alleged.
This concludes the Division's informal
investigative adjudication procedure.
ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION,

Randall Phillips, Investigator

Date

Jay Fowler^ vBirector

Date

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
UADD Case No. 92-0393
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECHT
COMPLAINANT,

*
*
*

vs.
KENNECOTT CORP., a Delaware
Corporation, licensed to do
business in the State of Utah
RESPONDENT.

*
*
*
*
*

ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On November (5$/, 1992, the Anti-Discrimination Division (Division) of the
Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issued a determination of "No
Reasonable Cause" that the Respondent has not violated the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
It is hereby ordered that the Charging Party's request for agency action is
dismissed in the above captioned case.
If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a written request for a formal
hearing must be filed with the Director of the Division within thirty (30)
days from the date of the issuance of this Order as specified in Section 3435-7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. A request
for agency review and a formal hearing will not be considered necessary if
the hearing will not add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause
the evidence to be viewed differently. If the Director receives no timely
request for a hearing, this Order becomes the final Order of the Commission
with no further rights of appeal as specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d),
U.C.A.
As a party to a complaint filed concurrently under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, you have the right to request a Substantial
Weight Review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. If you make
such a request, or pursue any other federal action, you will be barred,
pursuant to Section 34-35-7.1(16), U.C.A., from commencing or continuing any
adjudicative proceeding regarding this complaint before the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division. For a request for a Substantial Weight Review to be
honored, you mst notify the following within fifteen (15) days of the
issuance of this Order:
Antonio DeDios, State & Local Coordinator
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
4520 North Central Avenue, Suite 300,
Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Jay Fowle2^\ Acting Director
/

Date
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Erik Strindberg (Bar No. 4154)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South
Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Stephen E. Hausknect

STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT,
Complainant,
vs.

]I

NOTICE OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING

]
l
]

UADD No. 92-0393

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
Complainant,

Stephen

E.

Hausknect

(hereinafter

"Hausknect") by and through his undersigned attorney, and pursuant
to Utah Code Ann, § 34-35-7. 1(5)(c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah
Administration Code, hereby requests an Evidentiary Hearing on the
Determination rendered by Randall Phillips and Jay Fowler in this
matter.

That Determination concludes that complainant Hausknect

has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
and,

therefore,

there

is

"no

reasonable

cause"

to

believe

complainant was subjected to discriminatory practices. Complainant
Hausknect disagrees with this finding and contends that evidence
produced at a hearing will show not only that he has established a

prima facie case of age discrimination, but that the respondent
Kennecott Corporation is unable to show that a legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason existed for his termination.
Specific

grounds

for this Evidentiary Hearing are as

follows:
1.

An

Evidentiary

Hearing is

necessary

adequate and complete investigation can be done.

so that

an

The investigator

concluded that the evidence did not establish a prima facie case of
age discrimination.

However, evidence readily available to the

investigator would establish that:
a.

Complainant

was

a member

of

the

protected

group;
b.

He was discharged;

c.

He

was

qualified

to

do

the

job

(having

received a favorable rating twenty (20) days
before his discharge);
d.

The

work

performed

that
by

an

he

performed

outside

is

now

contractor

being,
and

by

certain college-age students.
It is obvious

from the investigator' s failure to uncover this

evidence that a hearing is needed so that basic evidence can be
collected and examined;

2

2.

An Evidentiary Hearing is also necessary so that

testimony can be taken from not only the complainant, but from the
other employees who were involved in the termination decision and
surrounding facts.

The determination of the investigator was made

solely on the basis of written statements prepared by legal
counsel.

No affidavits were collected nor interviews conducted by

the investigator.

Rule 560-1-4(A)(4) states that "in most cases,

the need to cross-examine the individuals who have submitted
affidavits supportive of the initial findings or determination of
the Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a
request for a hearing . . . "

Here a hearing is needed so that

crucial evidentiary testimony can be collected in the first place;
3.

The investigator1 s decision appears to be based

largely upon the fact that Kennecott, at one time, had also
terminated an individual under the age of forty (40), who had been
accused of sexual harassment.

However, this analysis ignores two

crucial facts: First, as the investigator acknowledged, that other
individual's work performance was unsatisfactory.

This is not the

case with the complainant, who had been success fully employed by
Kennecott

for

over

thirty-eight

(38) years.

Secondly,

the

investigator ignores, or brushes aside, the fact that another
employee under the age of forty

(40) was

accused of sexual

harassment was not fired, but merely transferred.
3

An Evidentiary

Hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and explored
which examines why Mr. Hausknect, a long-time valuable employee was
treated differently than this younger, much less senior employee,
and not given the opportunity to transfer.
4.

Evidence was presented in complainant' s charge that

his termination was motivated by Kennecott' s desire to reduce staff
in the facility in which the complainant worked prior to closing it
down.

By doing so, Kennecott would not have to pay significant

severance

benefits

investigated

at

to

all

the
by

complainant.

the

investigator.

This
A

issue

was

hearing

not

would

facilitate the development of this evidence, including providing
crucial information on Kennecott' s policies regarding lay-offs,
benefits and severance pay;
5.
regarding

A hearing is also necessary to produce evidence

Kennecott' s

training

policy.

Kennecott,

and

the

investigator relied heavily on Kennecott' s claim that complainant
knew or should have known that his conduct amounted to sexual
harassment.-

There is no supporting documentation or testimony in

the form of affidavits

to support Kennecott' s contention that

complainant received any training or counseling in this area.

An

Evidentiary Hearing would allow evidence to be presented on this
very important issue;

4

6.
adequately

Lastly,

an

investigate

Evidentiary

the

alleged

Hearing
basis

is
for

needed

to

Hausknect' s

termination (i.e. - that he harassed a certain female employees).
No affidavits or documentary evidence taken or examined by the
investigator to support or disprove this key issue (i.e. - that
there was a legitimate reason for complainant's discharge).

An

Evidentiary Hearing is necessary so that evidence and testimony can
be taken on this issue as well.
For

these

reasons,

complainant

requests

that

an

Evidentiary Hearing in this matter be held and that the initial
determination of the investigator not become the final Order of the
Commission.
DATED this

/ * day of December, 1992.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.

Erik Strindberg
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CERTIFICATE OF HMD-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was hand-delivered, on this p

day of December,

1992, to the following:
James M. Elegante
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P. O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147-08989
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146615
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615
Steven E. Hausknecht,
*

ORDER GRANTING
FORMAL HEARING
UPON FURTHER REVIEW

Charging Party,
Kennecott Corporation,

UADD No. 92-0393
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418

*

Respondent.

*

*********************************

The request for an evidentiary hearing, as well as the
response of the respondent, in the above entitled matter to review
de novo the Determination and Order of the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division having been duly considered, and it having been determined
that the CHARGING PARTY has met the requirements of law and does:
Show that a hearing will add to the evidence in
the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the
file may be viewed differently by the hearing,
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good
cause for the request,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the
CHARGING PARTY be, and the same is hereby, granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
state the date upon which it was mailed; and be sent by mail to the
undersigned, and to each party.

.len
iministrative Law Judge
Certified by the Industrial Commission of
Utah this^
1993.
ATTEST:
Patricia

sion Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on April^Qjvt"7^ t 1993, a copy of the
attached Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review, in the
UADD case of Stephen E. Hausknecht vs. Kennecott Corporation, was
ma iled to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:

Stephen E. Hausknecht
2158 Terra Linda Drive
SLC, UT 84041
Erik Strindberg
Attorney at Law
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
P O Box 11008
SLC, UT 84147r0008
Attorney at Law
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P. 0. Box 11898
SLC, UT 84147-0898
Anna R. Jensen
Director
Industrial Commission of Utah
UADD Division
160 East 300 South
SLC, UT 84114-6630

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Byl . V I C W A

PptLiA O \0_ V^

Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division
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James M. Elegante (0968)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
* * * * * * * *

Steven E. Hausknecht
Complainant,
vs.

)
)
)

MOTION FOR REVIEW

)

Kennecott Corporation,
Respondent.

)

UADD No. 92-0393

)

EEOC No. 35C-92-0418

* * * * * * * *

Respondent Kennecott Corporation, ("Kennecott"), by and
through its attorneys and pursuant to § 63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann.,
hereby moves the Industrial Commission to review the correctness of
the Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review ("Order")
issued April 26, 1993, grant the charging party a formal hearing.
This Motion for Review is brought on the grounds that the Order
does not comply with the requirements of Utah law for granting a
formal hearing from a determination and order entered by the AntiDiscrimination Division. Specifically, the Order fails to specify
the basis upon which it is granted and the record does not support
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the grant of a formal hearing.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
Mr. Hausknecht set forth six arguments in support of his
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing ("Request").

None of those

arguments provided a basis to warrant a hearing in this case.
Mr.

Hausknecht's

first

argument

was

that

" [a]n

evidentiary hearing is necessary so that an adequate and complete
investigation can be done" and "basic evidence can be collected and
examined."

Request at 2. This argument provided no basis for the

Order for the following reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is to give the Commission
the chance to "review de novo the Director's Determination." Utah
Admin. R. 560-1-4 (3). The purpose of a hearing is not to conduct
an investigation or collect evidence. That goal is accomplished by
the Industrial Commission Investigator assigned to the case.
fact finding phase of this case is over.

The

A thorough and complete

investigation took place and there were no deficiencies in the
investigation.
Second, Mr. Hausknecht

suggested

that he failed to

introduce the evidence at the investigation stage necessary to
support his claim of discrimination.
complete

However, an adequate and

investigation was conducted by Randall Phillips, the

Industrial Commission Investigator who handled this claim (the
"investigator") , and extensive evidence was collected and examined.
In the five months between the date this claim was filed and the
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date the Division issued its determination, the following evidence
was collected by the investigator:

(1) Kennepott's

10 page

response which included detailed and complete answers to a lengthy
set of investigative questions, a general statement, a copy of
Kennecott's sexual harassment policy, and 58

pages of detailed

notes related to Kennecott's investigation of Mr. Hausknecht's
conduct; (2) Mr. Hausknecht's reply to Kennecott's response; and
(3) Kennecott's detailed response to Mr. Hausknecht's reply letter.
Thus, more than just "basic evidence" was collected and examined by
the Division.
record.1

Indeed, extensive evidence was submitted into the

The investigator considered this evidence in making his

determination.

See "SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION" section of the

Determination.

Mr. Hausknecht's first argument was specious at

best and in fact, Mr. Hausknecht in essence admitted that in this
case an adequate investigation was conducted and that the necessary
evidence was submitted, when he stated that evidence related to the
issues which he claimed must be investigated was "readily available
to the investigator."

Request at 2.

Third, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit
1

This evidence showed inter alia: (1) Mr. Hausknecht's age had nothing to do with
Kennecott's decision to terminate his employment; (2) Kennecott terminated Mr.
Hausknecht's employment because he engaged in conduct described as pervasive sexual
harassment and because his performance was unsatisfactory; and (3) Mr. Hausknecht was
not subject to disparate treatment (in 1991, Kennecott terminated the employment of a
janitor who was under 40 years old for engaging in sexual harassment and whose
performance was unsatisfactory). See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; Kennecott's
August 20, 1992 Response; November 20, 1992, Determination.
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evidence at the investigation stage. Nevertheless, Mr. H?usknecht
submitted only arguments; he failed to submit any

facts which

would give the investigator a basis to rule in his favor.

It was

not through inadvertence that Mr. Hausknecht failed to submit any
factual evidence to support his claims; the reality is that his
claim is groundless.
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's first argument failed to
provide a basis to warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Mr. Hausknecht's second argument was based on Utah Admin.
R. 560-1-4(A)(4), which provides:
cross-examine
supportive

of

the

individuals

the

initial

"In most cases, the need to

who

finding

have
or

submitted

affidavits

determination

of

the

Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a request
for a hearing

by the

Commission."

(Emphasis

added).

Mr.

Hausknecht argued in the Request that "a hearing is needed so that
crucial evidentiary testimony can be taken in the first place."
Request at 3.

This argument similarly provided no basis for the

Order for the following reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to collect evidence.

See discussion above at 2.
Second, this rule is specifically limited to cases where

there

is a need

to cross-examine

"the

individuals who have

submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination." Utah Admin. R. 560-1-4(A)(4).
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In the instant case, as

Mr. Hausknecht admitted at page 3 of his Request, nc such individuals or affidavits exist.

In this case there is no allegation

and certainly no proof that evidence was in any way suppressed.
The investigator gave Mr. Hausknecht ample opportunity to present
any evidence which he wished in connection with this charge.
Furthermore, in this case there were no affidavits and counteraffidavits so that the veracity of a witness would have to be
determined by a fact finder.

The reality is that completely

unsubstantiated allegations were made by the charging party and
that

the responding

substantiate

the

party replied

reason

for

the

with

concrete evidence to

termination

of

employment.

Therefore, there is no need for the cross-examination contemplated
by this rule.
Third, during the investigation phase, Mr. Hausknecht
had every opportunity to submit any evidence to support his claim
of discrimination, including affidavits.

Nevertheless, he chose

not to do so.2 Mr. Hausknecht's complaint that affidavits were not
collected by the investigator does not advance his argument.

If

Mr. Hausknecht felt that affidavits were necessary, it was his duty
to submit them into the record.

It is not the duty of the

investigator to go out and obtain affidavits in support of Mr.
2

That Mr. Hausknecht would not support his claim with the affidavits of others is
not surprising: His coworkers, mostly females, were the victims of his sexual misbehavior,
so they could hardly be expected to provide support for his claim. There are no other
current or former workers similarly situated to support his specious claim.
-5-

Hausknecht's claim.
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's second argument failed to
warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the Administrative Law
Judge.
In his third argument, Mr. Hausknecht asserted that a
hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and explored
which examines why he was treated differently than a younger
employee who was the subject of a transfer as a result of his
sexually oriented misbehavior.

Request at 3.

This assertion is

premised on Mr. Hausknecht's claim that his work performance was
not unsatisfactory.

Mr. Hausknecht's third argument likewise

provided no basis for the Order for the following reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new
evidence.

See discussion above at 2.
Second, Mr. Hausknecht's sexually-oriented conduct was

pervasive.

Kennecott's internal investigation showed that his

conduct was more egregious than the conduct of the employee whose
employment was terminated and much more egregious than the conduct
of the employee who was reprimanded and transferred to another job.
His sexually-oriented activities in and of themselves provided a
sufficient basis to terminate his employment.
on

a

claim

that

Mr.

Hausknecht's

work

The argument, based

performance

unsatisfactory, is completely contrary to the

was not

facts. However, in

addition to his objectionable sexual behavior, Mr. Hausknecht's job
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performance was not satisfactory to Kennecott.3
June 10, 1992, Response; Determination.

See Kennecott's

Therefore, the issue is

whether Kennecott treated Mr. Hausknecht differently chan a younger
employee who, like Mr. Hausknecht, had engaged in sexual harassment
and whose work was unsatisfactory.

The evidence shows that

Kennecott terminated the employment of a janitor, who is under the
age of 40, because he engaged in sexually oriented behavior which
was

unacceptable

unsatisfactory.

and

because

his

work

performance

was

Id. Kennecott's treatment of an employee who had

engaged in similar behavior but whose job performance allowed
Kennecott to transfer him to another job has little relevance to
this case, and a hearing is not necessary to produce and explore
evidence related to that treatment.
Third, evidence related to Kennecott's decision to terminate Mr. Hausknecht's employment rather than transferring him has
already been produced.

See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response.

That evidence shows that Kennecott determined that Mr. Hausknecht's

The determinative issue in this case is whether Kennecott's motivation for
terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment was discriminatory, i.e., whether Kennecott
terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment because he is over 40 years of age. Whether
Kennecott actually had good cause to terminate Mr. Hausknecht's employment is not an
issue. In other words, the correctness or validity of Kennecott's proffered reasons for
terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment is irrelevant. Therefore, whether Hausknecht
was actually guilty of sexually unacceptable behavior and unsatisfactory job performance is
irrelevant so long as Kennecott believed he was guilty of these things. The dispositive point
is that Kennecott terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment for reasons (whether based in
actual fact or not) other than his age.
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activities and long-standing propensity to exact special favors
from female employees provided a sufficient basis in and of itself
to terminate his employment.
Fourth and finally, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity
at the investigation stage to submit evidence, rather than mere
argument, related to this issue and his claim of pretext, but he
failed to do so.4
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's third argument failed to
warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the Administrative Law
Judge.
Mr. Hausknecht's fourth argument was that a hearing is
necessary to facilitate the development of evidence related to his
allegation that Kennecott terminated his employment to avoid having
to pay him severance benefits. Request at 4. This argument fails
because:

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new

evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) the information contained
in

the

disclosures

made

by

Kennecott

to

the

demonstrated precisely the basis upon which Kennecott

investigator
terminated

the employment of Mr. Hausknecht; and (3) Mr. Hausknecht had ample
opportunity to submit evidence to support his claim relevant to
this issue at the investigation stage, but he failed to do so. The
reality is that no evidence was presented by the charging party

See footnote 2, supra.
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that his termination was motivated by Kennecotc's desire to reduce
staff and to save severance benefits.

In factf this issue did not

appear as part of the charge but was merely an argument raised by
the charging party in his July 22, 1992, reply statement at page 1.
Indeed the extent of the "evidence" offered was nothing more than
a bald suggestion of Kennecott's motivation. The facts in the case
completely refuted the suggestion and the charging party did not
substantiate the claim in any way.
Mr. Hausknecht's fifth argument was that a hearing is
necessary

to produce

evidence

related

to

Kennecott's

sexual

harassment policy and his knowledge of it. Request at 4. Like the
other arguments, this argument could not form the basis of the
Order because:

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new

evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it is irrelevant whether
Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual harassment,5 see
discussion above at n. 3; (3) evidence related
including

a

copy

of

the

policy,

was

to this issue,

submitted

during

the

investigation, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr.
Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit evidence related to this
issue at the investigation stage, but he failed to do so.
Mr. Hausknecht7s sixth and final argument was that a
5

It is simply incredible that in the face of his admissions that he was guilty of
hugging and kissing Kennecott's female employees and that in connection with his
employment he attempted to extract a kiss as payment for doing his job, Mr. Hausknecht
would now urge the Commission to hold a hearing to gather "crucial evidentiary testimony."
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hearing is needed to investigate and take evidence <»nd tescimony
related to one of the alleged bases (sexual harassment) for the
termination of his employment.
because:

Request at 5. This argument fails

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to investigate and

produce new evidence, see discussion

above at 2;

(2) it is

irrelevant whether Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual
harassment,

see discussion

above at n. 3;

(3) extensive and

detailed evidence related to the issue of Mr. Hausknecht's sexual
naughtiness, including 58 pages of notes from Kennecott's investigation, were submitted at the investigation stage, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr. Hausknecht had ample
opportunity to submit evidence related

to this issue at the

investigation stage, but he did not do so.6
In sum, none of Mr. Hausknecht's arguments provided any
basis whatsoever for the Administrative Law Judge to set this case
for a hearing.

The Request for a hearing should have been denied.

It is not sufficient for an Administrative Law Judge merely to
recite the law and to find merely that the law has been met when
specific bases for the formal adjudication have been asserted by
the charging party and those bases have each been completely
rebutted by the Responding Party.

6

One wonders whether at such a hearing Mr. Hausknecht would attempt now to
deny that he engaged in his objectionable behavior or whether more evidence of
unacceptable behavior would surface.
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RELIEF REQUESTED
The Commission

should

Administrative Law Judged

issue

its order vacating the

Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon

Further Review and denying a formal hearing on the charge.
DATED this \2 — day of May, 1993.

IES M. ELECXNT:
ELEGANTE
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
Kennecott Corporation
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Erik Strindberg
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
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P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-008
Anna R. Jensen
Director
Industrial Commission of Utah
Antidiscrimination Division
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146640
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6640
Stephen Hadley, Chairman
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT,
Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

vs.

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,

Case No.

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
REVDXW AND ORDER OF CLARD7ICATION ISSUED BY
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH.

Erik Strindberg (4154)
Martha S. Stonebrook (5149)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Appellant

James M. Elegante
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Attorney for Appellee/Kennecott Corp.

court must grant relief if it finds that the Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted the law
to appellant's substantial prejudice. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Appellant, Stephen E. Hausknect, filed a charge of age discrimination in

employment with the UADD on or about May 12, 1992.
2.

The UADD entered a no cause determination on November 20, 1992.

3.

On December 18, 1992, appellant, through his counsel, filed a Notice of

Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7. l(5)(c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah
Administration Code, reauesting an evidentiary hearing on the determination rendered by the
UADD.
4.

On April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge for

the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting formal hearing upon further review
wherein Judge Allen determined that appellant had met the requirements of law necessary to
show entitlement to a hearing.
5.

On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for Review of Judge Allen's Order

granting appellant a formal hearing.
6.

On October 26, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting

Motion for Review which "ordered that the Motion for Review of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is hereby denied."
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7.

On November 5, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order of

Clarification wherein it "ordered that [Kennecott's] Motion for Review requesting that the
evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby granted and the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge to grant the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed."
8.

Appellant appeals the Industrial Commission of Utah's Order of Clarification

which reversed the decision of Judge Allen granting appellant an evidentiary hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's granting of
appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing violated appellant's right to due process.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ALJ'S DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS.
It is well recognized that "implicit in the due process clause of our State Constitution is
that persons be afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law." Gribble v. Gribble.
583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978). The Commission's summary dismissal of appellant's request for
an evidentiary hearing deprived him of his only remedy under the state anti-discrimination laws
without appellant ever having had a hearing of any kind. As such, the Commission's refusal to
grant appellant a hearing constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances: it is flexible and
requires such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands. In an analysis of a procedure an important factor is the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards.
Worrall v. QgdenCitv Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). Here, there has been
an erroneous deprivation of appellant's interest by the Commission's refusal to adequately
consider appellant's request for hearing.
In Utah, courts have repeatedly reviewed administrative hearings and proceedings to
determine whether both the procedures are satisfactory and the outcome is fair. For instance,
in Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978), the Utah
Supreme Court was asked to review the decision of the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission
upholding the discharge of the Chief of Police.

The court noted that the review of the

Commission's decision was warranted and authorized by the Utah Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 9. The court then stated that it had the power to grant relief from that decision if it
found that the Commission had "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion." The court
went on to review the decision to determine if the findings and order of the Commission had
been "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable."
In Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court was asked to overturn the decision of the Industrial Commission on the grounds
-4-

that the Administrative Law Judge had previously represented one of the parties in the hearing.
In reaching its conclusion that the decision should be overturned, the court stated:
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties
to a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. 'A fair trial
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' (citation
omitted)
Id. at 1221. Here, appellant was denied a fair trial in a fair tribunal and, thus, was denied due
process.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331
(Utah 1987) emphasized the requirement that every person is entitled to a fair hearing:
. . . every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing
held before an administrative agency, has a due process right to
receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Anderson v.
Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985).
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors
to prevent even the possibility of unfairness. Id. at 1221. . . .
our review of the record persuades us that the manner in which the
Administrative Law Judge conducted this hearing was sufficiently
unfair as to constitute the denial of plaintiffs constitutional right
to a fair hearing.
Bunnell, at 1333. Here, it was patently unfair to deny appellant an opportunity to be heard in
a de novo review hearing.
This requirement that all hearings, including administrative hearings, comport with
minimum standards of fairness was further developed in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney.
818 P. 2d 23 (Utah App. 1991). There, the plaintiff challenged the results of a grievance hearing
held before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council on the grounds that hearsay evidence
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had been admitted. The court concluded that the admission of such evidence was unfair because
it prevented Tolman from exercising his right to cross-examine witnesses and therefore violated
his right to due process. The court emphasized:
Every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing held
before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive
a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Bunnell, 740 P.2d at 1333.
As a general rule, 'due process demands a new trial when the
appearance of unfairness is so plain, that we are left with the
abiding impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing
unfair.' Id. Note 1.
Tolman. at 28.
The Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's grant of an evidentiary
hearing does not rise to the basic level of fairness enunciated and required by the Utah Supreme
Court. The Commission's refusal to allow appellant a hearing to which he was entitled violates
appellant's fundamental due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal.
Anderson v. Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). Therefore, appellant
respectfully submits that the Commission's Order was improper and substantially prejudices him
by denying him due process of law. As such, the Administrative Law Judge's Order granting
appellant a hearing should be reinstated.

n.
Appellant MADE AN ADEQUATE SHOWING THAT A HEARING
WOULD ADD TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE FILE AND/OR
SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE VIEWED
DIFFERENTLY AFTER THE HEARING.
-6-

Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge, entered his Order granting
appellant's request for hearing after taking into account both appellant's reasons supporting his
request and Kennecott's responses in opposition to the request.

Specifically, Judge Allen

determined that appellant had met the requirement of law and had shown "that a hearing will add
to the evidence in the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the file may be viewed
differently by the hearing." In spite of this determination, the Commission reversed Judge
Allen's Order and essentially accepted the UADD's determination verbatim without giving any
credence to the reasons enunciated by plaintiff in his request for a hearing.

Appellant,

therefore, files this appeal .on the additional grounds that he sufficiently showed that a hearing
was warranted and that the Commission, in reversing presiding Administrative Law Judge
Allen's Order, failed to consider the facts and argument presented by appellant.
Appellant requested a hearing because the investigation that was conducted in this matter
was extremely limited. Other than the initial statement submitted by the appellant, no affidavits
or sworn statements appear to have been provided to the investigator. Because of the extremely
limited nature of the investigation, an evidentiary hearing on this case is warranted.
Additionally, a hearing is needed for the following reasons:
1.

Collection of evidence. Other than certain cursory and conclusory statements

submitted on behalf of the appellant and the respondent, there has been no admissible evidence
(other than appellant's initial statement) submitted to the investigator. A hearing is necessary
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so that witnesses can be called, testimony taken and various documentary evidence presented to
the Commission;
2.

Cross-examination of the witnesses. A hearing is necessary so that individuals

who have knowledge and information relevant to appellant's claims can be put on the stand and
cross-examined by the appellant. It is well established that cross-examination of witnesses is a
minimum requirement of due process. State of Utah v. Stames. 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App.
1992);
3.

Compel certain witnesses to testify. It is virtually impossible for appellant, in

support of his UADD claim to contact Kennecott employees who may be able to provide
testimony which substantiates appellant's claims. Those individuals would understandably be
reluctant to voluntarily give statements to appellant during the investigation inasmuch as they
would fear that adverse employment actions might or will be taken against them.

The

investigator never sought testimony from Kennecott's employees. A hearing would provide
appellant the opportunity to subpoena Kennecott employees who may have testimony favorable
to his position.
As set forth above, the Commission's reversal of Judge Allen's Order granting a hearing
is fundamentally unfair and denies appellant his right to due process and precludes him from
pursuing its statutory remedies.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, appellant asserts that the Commission's Order reversing
Judge Allen's Order is fundamentally unfair and denies him his due process right to receive a
fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Moreover, the Commission's total reliance on the UADD's
determination raises the question of whether appellant's Request for Hearing and the facts and
arguments set forth therein were ever even considered by the Commission before it reversed
Judge Allen's grant of an evidentiary hearing.
A de novo evidentiary hearing would add to the scant evidence in the case and would
show that the evidence in the investigatory file would be viewed differently. Thus, appellant
respectfully requests that this court overturn the Commission's decision and to order that
appellant be entitled to an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the Determination and Order
of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division.
DATED this (C

day of December, 1993.

Martha S. Stonebrook
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Appellant

(lj/hauskn.brf)
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT,
Appellant,

MOTION TO RENAME DOCUMENT
ENTITLED APPELLANT'S BRIEF

vs.
KENNECOTT CORPORATION,

Case No.

Appellee.
Stephen E. Hausknect, by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby moves this court
to rename the document that was entitled "Appellant's Brief" and filed with this court on
December 6, 1993 to Petition for Review. To aid this court in renaming the document entitled
Appellant's Brief, Hausknect hereby submits a cover page encaptioned Petition for Review and
hereby respectfully requests that this court substitute the attached cover sheet for the cover sheet
encaptioned Appellant's Brief.
DATED thisy__ day of December, 1993.
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Martha S. Stonebrook
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Erik Strindberg (4154)
Martha S. Stonebrook (5149)
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JURISDICTION
Appellant seeks review of an Order of the Industrial Commission which granted
Kennecott Copper's Motion for Review and, in so doing, denied appellant's request for an
evidentiary hearing. (A copy of the Order of Clarification and Order Granting Motion for
Review are attached hereto in appellant's Addendum as Exhibit "A"). U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(12)
provides that an Order of the Industrial Commission concerning a written request for review is
subject to judicial review as provided in U.C.A. §63-46b-16. U.C.A. §63-46b-16 provides:
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting
from formal adjudicated proceedings.
As such, this court has jurisdiction to review the Order of Clarification and Order Granting
Motion for Review issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah.
ISSUE FOR REVIEW
Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in overturning the Administrative Law Judge's
Order granting appellant a formal hearing?
Standard of Review:

Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(d), this court shall grant relief if

appellant has been "substantially prejudiced" because the Industrial Commission has "erroneously
interpreted 01: implied the law." Because this matter presents a question of statutory construction
and legislative intent, this court may review for correctness and need not defer to the agency's
interpretation. Crosland v. Board of Review. 828 P.2d 528, 529-30 (Utah App. 1992). This

court must grant relief if it finds that the Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted the law
to appellant's substantial prejudice. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Appellant, Stephen E. Hausknect, filed a charge of age discrimination in

employment with the UADD on or about May 12, 1992.
2.

The UADD entered a no cause determination on November 20, 1992.

3.

On December 18, 1992, appellant, through his counsel, filed a Notice of

Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7. l(5)(c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah
Administration Code, requesting an evidentiary hearing on the determi nation rendered by the
UADD.
4.

On April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge for

the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting formal hearing upon further review
wH

determined that appellant had met the requirements of law necessary to

show entitlement to a hearing.
5.

On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for Review of Judge Allen's Order

granting appellant a formal hearing.
6.

On October 26,1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting

Motion for Review which "ordered that the Motion for Review of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is hereby denied/
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7.

On November 5, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order of

Clarification wherein it "ordered that [Kennecott's] Motion tor Review requesting that the
evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby granted and the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge to grant the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed."
8.

Appellant appeals the Industrial Commission of Utah's Order of Clarification

which reversed the decision of Judge Allen granting appellant an evidentiary hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's granting of
appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing violated appellant's right to due process.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE AU'S DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS.
It is well recognized that "implicit in the due process clause of our State Constitution is
that persons he afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law." Gribble v. Gribble.
583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978). The Commission's summary dismissal of appellant's request for
an evidentiary hearing deprived him of his only remedy under the state anti-discrimination laws
without appellant ever having had a hearing of any kind. As such, the Comniission's refusal to
grant appellant a hearing constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and
requires such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands. In an analysis of a procedure an important factor is the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards.
Worrall v. OgdenCitv Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). Here, there has been
an erroneous deprivation of appellant's interest by the Commission's refusal to adequately
consider appellant's request for hearing.
In Utah, courts have repeatedly reviewed administrative hearings and proceedings to
determine whether both the procedures are satisfactory and the outcome is fair. For instance,
in Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission. 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978), the Utah
Supreme Court was asked to review the decision of the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission
upholding the discharge of the Chief of Police.

The court noted that the review of the

Commission's decision was warranted and authorized by the Utah Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 9. The court then stated that it had the power to grant relief from that decision if it
found that the Commission had "exceeded its jurisdiction or '.bused ics discretion." The court
went on to review the decision to determine if the findings and order of the Commission had
been "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,"
In Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court was asked to overturn the decision ofTthe Industrial Commission on the grounds
-4-

that the Administrative Law Judge had previously represented one of the parties in the hearing.
In reaching its conclusion that the decision should be overturned, the court stated:
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties
to a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. 'A fair trial
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' (citation
omitted)
Id. at 1221. Here, appellant was denied a fair trial in a fair tribunal and, thus, was denied due
process.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d 1331
(Utah 1987) emphasized the requirement that every person is entitled to a fair hearing:
. . . every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing
held before an administrative agency, has a due process right to
receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Anderson v.
Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985).
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors
to prevent even the possibility of unfairness. Id. at 1221. . . .
our review of the record persuades us that the manner in which the
Administrative Law Judge conducted this hearing was sufficiently
unfair as to constitute the denial of plaintiffs constitutional right
to a fair hearing.
Bunnell, at 1333. Here, it was patently unfair to deny appellant an opportunity to be heard in
a de novo review hearing.
This requirement that all hearings, including administrative hearings, comport with
minimum standards of fairness w as further developed in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney,
818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991). There, the plaintiff challenged the results of a grievance hearing
held before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council on the grounds that hearsay evidence
-5-

had been admitted The court concluded that the admission of such evidence was unfair because
it prevented Tolman from exercising his right to cross-examine witnesses did tini efore violated
his right to due process. The court emphasized:
Every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing held
before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive
a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Bunnell, 740 P.2d at 1333.
As a general rule, 'due process demands a new trial when the
appearance of unfairness is so plain, that we are left with the
abiding impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing
unfair.' Id. Note 1.
Tolman, at 28.
The Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's grant of an evidentiary
hearing does not rise to the basic level of fairness enunciated and required by the Utah Supreme
Court. The Commission's refusal to allow appellant a hearing to which he was entitled violates
appellant's fundamental due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal.
Anderson v. Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). Therefore, appellant
respectfully submits that the Commission's Order was improper and substannallv prejudices him
by denying him due process of law. As such, the Administrative Law Judge's Order granting
appellant a hearing should be reinstated.

n.
APPELLANT MADE AN ADEQUATE SHOWING THAT A
HEARING WOULD ADD TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE
FILE AND/OR SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE
WOULD BE VIEWED DIFFERENTLY
AFTER THE HEARING.
-6-

Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge, entered his Order granting
appellant's request for hearing after taking into account both appellant's reasons supporting his
request and Kennecott's responses in opposition to the request.

Specifically, Judge Allen

determined that appellant had met the requirement of law and had shown "that a hearing will add
to the evidence in the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the file may be viewed
differently by the hearing." In spite of this determination, the Commission reversed Judge
Allen's Order and essentially accepted the UADD's determination verbatim without giving any
credence to the reasons enunciated by plaintiff in his request for a hearing.

Appellant,

therefore, files this appeal on the additional grounds that he sufficiently showed that a hearing
was warranted and that the Commission, in reversing presiding Administrative Law Judge
Allen's Order, failed to consider the facts and argument presented by appellant.
Appellant requested a hearing because the investigation that was conducted in this matter
was extremely limited. Other than the initial statement submitted by the appellant, no affidavits
or sworn statements appear to have been provided to the investigator. Because of the extremely
limited nature of the investigation, an evidentiary hearing on this case is warranted.
Additionally, a hearing is needed for the following reasons:
1.

Collection of evidence. Other than certain cursory and conclusory statements

submitted on behalf of the appellant and the respondent, there has been no admissible evidence
(other than appellant's initial statement) submitted to the investigator. A hearing is necessary
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so that witnesses can be called, testimony taken and various documentary evidence presented to
the Commission;
2.

Cross-examination of the witnesses, A hearing is necessary so that individuals

who have knowledge and information relevant to appellant's claims can be put on the stand and
cross-examined by the appellant. It is well established that cross-examination of witnesses is a
minimum requirement of due process. State of Utah v. S tames. 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App.
1992);
3.

Compel certain witnesses to testify. It is virtually impossible for appellant, in

support of his UADD claim to contact Kennecott employees who may be able to provide
testimony which substantiates appellant's claims. Those individuals would understandably be
reluctant to voluntarily give statements to appellant during the investigation inasmuch as they
would fear that adverse employment actions might or will be taken against them.

The

investigator never sought testimony from Kennecott's employees. A hearing would provide
appellant the opportunity to subpoena Kennecott employees who may have testimony favorable
to his position.
As set forth above, the Commission's reversal of Judge Allen's Order granting a hearing
is fundamentally unfair and denies appellant his right to due process and precludes him from
pursuing its statutory remedies.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, appellant asserts that the Commission's Order reversing
Judge Allen's Order is fundamentally unfair and denies him his due process right to receive a
fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Moreover, the Commission's total reliance on the UADD's
determination raises the question of whether appellant's Request for Hearing and the facts and
arguments set forth therein were ever even considered by the Commission before it reversed
Judge Allen's grant of an evidentiary hearing.
A de novo evidentiary hearing would add to the scant evidence in the case and would
show that the evidence in the investigatory file would be viewed differently. Thus, appellant
respectfully requests that this court overturn the Commission's decision and to order that
appellant be entitled to an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the Determination and Order
of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division.
DATED this (Q

day of December, 1993.

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Appellant

Oj/hauskn.brf)
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT,
Petitioner,

]
]1

vs.

)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION and
KENNECOTT CORPORATION,

;
;>

Respondents.
1.

DOCKETING STATEMENT

Case No. 930768-CA

]

Date of entry of Judgment or Order appealed from: Petitioner seeks review

of the Order of Clarification issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah on November 4, 1993.
2.

Nature of Post-Judgment Motion(s) and Date(s) filed: None.

3.

Date and effect of Order(s) disposing of Post-Judgment Motion(s) and Order

of Determination of Final Judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b): None.
4.

Date of filing of Petition for Review: December 6, 1993.

5.

Jurisdiction: This court has jurisdiction over this Petition for Review pursuant

to §35-1-82.53(2) which provides that an Order of the Industrial Commission on review is final,
unless set aside by the Court of Appeals.

6.

Name of the agency: This Petition is to review an Order of the Industrial

Commission of Utah, an administrative agency.
7.

Statement of Facts:
a.

Petitioner, Stephen E. Hausknect, filed a charge of age discrimination in
employment with the UADD on or about May 12, 1992.

b.

The UADD entered a no cause determination on November 20, 1992.
This no cause determination was issued by the investigator based on
information submitted by counsel for both parties. It appears that the
determination was issued without any interviews with witnesses or other
testimony being taken by the investigator.

c.

On December 18, 1992, petitioner, through his counsel, filed a Notice of
Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7. l(5)(c) and
Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah Administrative Code, requesting an evidentiary
hearing on the determination rendered by the UADD.

d.

On April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law
Judge for the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting
formal hearing upon further review wherein Judge Allen determined that
appellant had met the requirements of law necessary to show entitlement
to a hearing.
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e.

On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for review of Judge Allen's
Order granting appellant a formal hearing.

f.

On October 26, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order
granting Motion for Review which "ordered that the Motion for Review
of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is
hereby denied."

g.

On November 5, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an
Order of Clarification wherein it "ordered that [Kennecott's] Motion for
Review requesting that the evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby granted
and the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to grant the evidentiary
hearing is hereby reversed."

h.

On December 6, 1993, petitioner petitioned for review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah's Order of Clarification which reversed the decision
of Judge Allen and denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing.

8.

Issue for Review and Standard of Review:
Issue:

Did the Industrial Commission of Utah error in overturning the

Administrative Law Judge's Order granting petitioner a formal hearing?
Standard of Review: Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(d), this court shall grant relief
if appellant/petitioner has been "substantially prejudiced" because the Industrial Commission has
"erroneously interpreted or implied the law." Because this matter presents a question of
-3-

statutory construction and legislative intent, this court may review for correctness and need not
defer to the agency's interpretation. Crosland v. Board of Review. 828 P.2d 528, 529-30 (Utah
App. 1992). This court must grant relief if it finds that the Industrial Commission erroneously
interpreted the law to petitioner's substantial prejudice. Id.
9.

Determination of Case by Supreme Court: Not applicable.

10.

Determinative Law: This Petition will require review of the Anti Discrimination

Act, U.CA. §34-35-1 et sea.; the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 63-46b-l et seq.,
including but not limited to §§ 63-46b-l, 6, 7, and 8; Utah Administrative Code, R560-1-1 et
seq.: and Article I, §7 of the Constitution of Utah.
11.

Related Appeals: None.

12.

Attachments: Petitioner has attached hereto the documents identified in the

Statement of Facts, 17.
SUBMITTED this / 7

/
day of February, 1994.

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the //

day of February, 1994, to the following:

James M. Elegante
Alan K. Flake
Attorney for Kennecott Corp.

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Thomas C. Sturdy
Sharon J. Eblen
Attorney for Industrial Commission of Utah
Industrial Commission of Utah
Heb*er M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-6600
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Stephen E. Hausknect,
Petitioner,

NOTICE
Case No. 930768-CA

v.

The I n d u s t r i a l Commission, and
Kennecott Corporation,
Respondent.

TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:

This case is being considered for summary disposition,
pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 10(e), on the
grounds that the filing fee was not paid within 30 days after
the date of the written decision to be reviewed.

Prowswood,

Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984).
The parties are requested to file a memorandum, not to
exceed ten pages, explaining why the petition should or should
not be dismissed for failure to file the filing fee within 30
days after the date of the decision to be reviewed.
The memoranda shall be filed simultaneously and shall be
due on or before January 27, 1994.
Dated this y^V^day of January, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

RECEIVED
T. Greenwood, Judge

JAN 1 819M
•%

n.ui>
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